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9Summary
Desiccation of natural areas became a serious environmental problem in the Netherlands
during the last decade. The main factors that are causing the problem are hydrological meas-
ures for the improvement of the drainage system beneficial for agriculture, and groundwater
extractions by agriculture, industries and water companies. Hydrological measures contribute
with 60% and groundwater extractions contribute with 30% to desiccation. Rearrangements
of the hydrological system are supposed to be the major strategy to reduce desiccation,
whereas reduction of groundwater extractions is only seen as a secondary option. However,
on certain locations, where large amounts of groundwater are extracted from the same spot,
extraction activities have a significant impact on desiccation. The circumstances and causes of
the desiccation problem can hence differ from location to location, which implies that anti-
desiccation strategies need a region specific approach.
The Netherlands is characterized by its high population density and economic activity.
Many different users with different concerns about water quality and groundwater level com-
pete for the resource on a spatially limited area. Compared to other OECD countries the
withdrawal of freshwater per capita per year is relatively low in the Netherlands. This could
be an indication for a rather efficient use of water. However, high population density and eco-
nomic activity forces people to treat groundwater resources even more efficiently than is
already done.
The fact that many different users compete for the resource points out that water is ap-
plicable in many divers ways. This special characteristic of water makes it difficult to attach a
proper price for water use. Instream uses, where water is used directly for consumption or for
a production process, are easier to evaluate than offstream uses, such as fishery, nature con-
servation, navigation or recreation. The problem of finding a proper price for water resources
shows its consequences in externalities arising from economic activities that make use of wa-
ter resources. As a matter of fact, desiccation can be seen as an externality arising from
agricultural activities that do not seem to pay the proper price for the drainage and discharge
of water. Due to inadequate prices for water resources the market fails to allocate the resource
in an optimal way. As a result, overuse and waste of water are inevitable.
Economic instruments can contribute to a correction of the market failure. In interna-
tional literature several economic instruments can be found that are applied to economize
water use. Economic instruments can be categorized roughly into market-based and nonmar-
ket-based incentives. The market-based incentives aim at the resource itself by increasing its
economic value in order to approach an optimal allocation. The most important market-based
instruments are prices, tradable rights, effluent and pollution charges, subsidies and taxes.
Nonmarket-based instruments have a more dictating and compulsory character. The most im-
portant nonmarket-based incentives are restrictions, quotas, licenses and public information
and education.
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The examples of economic instruments found in international literature come from re-
gions of absolute water scarcity. In the Netherlands a lot of effort is put into getting rid of
superfluous water. The Dutch water problem is hence not a case of absolute water scarcity.
Difficulties arise with the availability of good quality water. Good quality water is economi-
cally scarce because the treatment of surface water is still rather expensive, at least more
expensive than the extraction of groundwater. The poorer the quality of surface water the
higher the costs for its purification. This indicates that quality and quantity aspects of water
are closely related to each other.
If economic instruments are to be used for the reduction of desiccation, they should be
applied to both hydrological measures and groundwater extraction. Since the reduction of
desiccation demands a region-specific approach, there is no nationwide solution to the prob-
lem. A first attempt at applying economic instruments to stimulate rearrangements of the
hydrological system is done in the quantitative part of this report.
The quantitative part describes the conflict between agriculture and nature and their
competing interests concerning the groundwater table in a simplified model. Five functions
for five different crops (grassland, maize, potatoes, sugar beets and grain) that describe the
relationship between crop yields and groundwater table are estimated. The functions exhibit
yield depressions due to water overload and due to drought. By maximizing total agricultural
revenue, which is the sum of revenues of the five different crops, the model calculates the op-
timal groundwater table for agriculture. With the introduction of a value-of-nature function
that describes the value-of-nature with respect to the groundwater table, an optimal combined
groundwater table for both, agriculture and nature, can be obtained. A sensitivity analysis on
the valuation of the natural area and the specification of the value-of-nature function shows
that the optimal combined groundwater table depends strongly on these two aspects. The nu-
meric results of this quantitive model have to be interpreted as the outcomes of an example to
illustrate the applied methodology.
It is proposed that economic instruments, such as taxes or charges aiming at farmers
who prefer a lower groundwater table than the combined one, could be introduced. The agri-
cultural losses occurring due to the optimal combined groundwater table that is higher than
the optimal groundwater table for agriculture, give an indication of the proper tax
rates/heights of charges. In order to be effective, tax rates/charges have to be higher than agri-
cultural losses. Since the optimal combined groundwater table varies according the different
specifications of the value-of-nature, losses to agriculture vary and likewise the proper tax
rates/heights of charges.
If economic instruments are to be applied to hydrological measures, the valuation of the
natural area under consideration plays an important role. The valuation of nature depends on
several factors, such as the quality of the specific ecosystem, the attractiveness for recreation
activities or the distance to cities. These factors differ from region to region, which is again an
indication for the region-specific approach that has to be taken in anti-desiccation strategies.
A successful strategy against desiccation has to consider the special circumstances and
causes of the problem that are different from location to location. This requires an intensive
knowledge of hydrological, biological and ecological processes in order to detect the most
successful measures for reaching the target of desiccation reduction. An interdisciplinary ap-
proach is hence required.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Definition of the problem
This report deals with problems around water management in the Netherlands with special
attention to the desiccation of natural areas due to decreasing groundwater tables. The central
point is the question if economic instruments can make a positive contribution to mitigate the
desiccation problem. Economic instruments play an important role in controlling environ-
mental degradations arising from economic activity. Some famous examples are pollution
taxes or tradable rights for the emission of polluting elements. In countries where the man-
agement of water scarcity is a traditional problem, economic instruments have been
introduced in order to stimulate users to a more conscience application of water. A further
concern in this report is to what extent the water problem in these countries is comparable to
the Dutch situation.
Although the Netherlands are known as the country that has to make a lot of effort to
pump away superfluous water in order to keep the land dry, problems arise with respect to
water scarcity. The shortage of water is becoming most evident in the problems around desic-
cation. The general definition of desiccation as it is found throughout the literature in the
Netherlands says that an area is characterized as 'desiccated' if its groundwater level is not
high enough to fulfil and maintain all natural functions that are combined within this area.
Moreover, an area with nature as its main function is seen as desiccated if for compensation
purposes non-local surface water of less quality that does not meet the quality demand of the
local ecosystem has to be provided.
Desiccation is caused by man-induced changes of the natural hydrological system that
entails a lowering of the original groundwater table. The most important impact arises from
land consolidation and drainage and discharge of water for agricultural benefits. These activi-
ties cause 60% of the desiccation problem. Other causes are the extraction of groundwater for
drinking water and industry as well as diverse actions such as the expansion of coniferous for-
ests, the increase in evapotranspiration of crops due to intensified agricultural production, and
the growth of urbanized area. Groundwater extraction causes further 30% of the problem
whereas the remaining 10% arise from the divers actions (Ministry of Transport and Public
Works, 1996; Feddes et al., 1997).
In 1996 the total desiccated area in the Netherlands was estimated at about 630,000 ha
(Ministry of Transport and Public Works, 1996). This is about 18.5% of the total surface of
the Netherlands, which is 34,000 km!. Desiccation does not have the same characteristics and
degree of severity in all affected areas. The consequences of the problem depend much on the
type of soil, the geographical setting, and the sensitivity of the local ecosystem. As an exam-
ple, the damage is especially severe along the coastal dunes and on areas with sandy soil.
Figure 1.1 shows a map of the desiccated areas in the Netherlands. The main context in which
this research takes place is depicted in figure 1.2. The figure shows the groundwater table as
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the central point with different influencing factors around it. Agriculture, industry and water
supply companies represent the group of extractors. Next to extraction activities, agriculture
has an impact on the groundwater table through hydrological regulation, such as drainage, and
increased evapotranspiration of plants due to intensified production. Through their influence
on the groundwater table, all factors have an impact on the biodiversity of nature.
Figure 1.1 Desiccated Areas in the Netherlands (Situation in 1994)
Source: Beugelink et al., 1995.
The center of attention in the discussion around desiccation is the conflict between
agriculture and nature. On the one hand, agriculture benefits from a lowering of the
groundwater table because drained fields attain higher yields. On the other hand, adjoined
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natural areas suffer damage to their ecological diversity if the groundwater level is too low
to fulfill all ecological functions. During the last decades the natural hydrological system in
the Netherlands has been adapted to the demands of an intensifying agricultural sector. The
improvement of the drainage and discharge system had been initiated by an inventory of
the hydrological situation in the Netherlands in 1958 (Feddes et al., 1997). At that time it
appeared that 60% of the agricultural area had a crop yield decrease due to water excess,
whereas 40% had a yield decrease due to dryness.
Figure 1.2 Factors Influencing the Groundwater Table
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A method to quantify the conflict between agriculture and nature will be presented in a
model that calculates the optimal groundwater table from a social point of view. Important
elements in this model are the relationship between the groundwater table and agricultural
crop yield and the valuation of natural areas. Attention is also paid to the role that economic
instruments could play in the determination of the optimal groundwater table.
1.2 Motivation
Problems around environmental sound water management are not only occurring in the Neth-
erlands. During the last decades increasing demand accompanied by pollution of good-quality
water resources has become a familiar picture all over the world. In some areas water scarcity
is seen as a major reason for future wars and conflicts. Several causes for this development
can be mentioned. Increasing consumption and growing world population induced the in-
crease of water use in agriculture, industry, and households. Especially in developing
countries population growth brought about the conversion of land of minor quality into agri-
cultural land, applying intensive irrigation in order to make this land suitable for agriculture.
In contrast to this, as in the case of the Netherlands agricultural land needs to be drained or
has to be provided with an artificial lowering of the groundwater level for cultivation. Drain-
age implies that water is carried away quickly to waterways and therefore percolation to
recharge groundwater aquifers is interrupted. Increasing urbanization has similar effects: ex-
pansion of concrete areas and sewage systems takes more water to the big rivers and thus
interrupting the natural cycle.
The countries where water management became an important governmental task are
mainly situated in the arid regions of the world where absolute water scarcity is apparent. In
this countries different economic instruments have been introduced in order to find a way out
of the problem of decreasing water resources. The motivating question is now if these instru-
ments are also applicable to the Dutch situation and to the special circumstances that are
ruling in the Netherlands.
1.3 Objectives
The main objective in this report is as follows:
What is the role of economic instruments in Dutch water management and to what extent can
they contribute to a reduction of desiccation?
In order to get insight into this main objective, some sub-questions have to be answered.
− What is the situation of desiccation in the Netherlands? Are there any specialties with re-
spect to water in the Netherlands that have to be taken into account in management
strategies? What is the situation of the different water users in the Netherlands?
− what are the special economic characteristics of water as a natural resource?
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− what can be found about managing water scarcity through the introduction of economic
instruments in international literature? Are there any differences in the water problem
between other countries and the Netherlands?
− the quantitative part of this thesis illuminates the competing relationship concerning the
groundwater table between agriculture and nature. The following objectives are put for the
quantitative analysis;
− finding a function that describes the relationship between agricultural crop yield and the
groundwater table;
− finding the optimal groundwater level for agricultural production and indicating losses to
agriculture that occur through higher groundwater tables;
− finding a function that describes the value of nature with respect to the groundwater table;
− how can an optimal groundwater table for both, agriculture and nature, be obtained?
− can economic instruments be introduced to reach this optimal groundwater table?
− how sensitive is the optimal combined groundwater table with respect to the value of na-
ture?.
1.4 Methodology
Different methodologies are used to find answers to the questions that are listed above. Exten-
sive literature research is used to find out some facts about desiccation, the situation of water
in the Netherlands and economic instruments in water management. For the characteristics of
the water problem in the Netherlands domestic literature is the main source of information.
Additionally, readings, discussions and debates about desiccation that took place on the 'Ken-
nismarkt' (market of knowledge) in Wageningen on April, the17th and 18th 1998, contributed
much to the clarification of the problem. For the explanation of the economic attributes of
water and the different economic instruments that are used in water management international
literature about environmental economic issues in general and the economics of natural re-
sources has been consulted.
In order to get insight into the applicability of economic instruments to the water
problem in the Netherlands, qualitative analysis with the help of (+, -)-tables is used. The
economic instruments are tested on their impact on different criteria that have to be re-
garded if these instruments were to be implemented. The different criteria are effecti-
veness, equity, acceptability, financial impact, controllability, interregional acceptability,
behavioral changes and environmental impact.
For the relationship between the groundwater table and crop yields the estimation tech-
nique of regression analysis is used. Five different crops are taken into account in the analysis,
namely, grassland, maize, potatoes, sugar beets and grain. Since the relationship between crop
yields and the groundwater table is supposed to describe a parabolic shape, curve estimations
with quadratic and cubic functional forms are carried out. The computer program SPSS pro-
vides the proper software for the estimation procedures.
The five different functions resulting from the regression analysis are used for finding
the optimal groundwater table for agricultural production. The optimal groundwater table is
obtained by maximizing total revenue, which is the sum of the revenues of the five different
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crops. The revenues of the five different crops are calculated by multiplying the respective
yield, price and hectares cultivated land. The optimization program GAMS serves for the cal-
culations.
An optimal combined groundwater table for both, agriculture and nature, can be ob-
tained in two ways. One way is to equate marginal costs for agriculture and marginal benefits
for nature due to higher groundwater tables and the other one is to maximize the revenue of
agriculture and nature together. Both ways will lead to the same results. The calculations in
connection with equalizing marginal costs and benefits and the sensitivity analysis are also
carried out with the computer program Matlab.
1.5 Structure of the report
The following chapter, chapter 2, serves to understand the prevailing circumstances of the
water problem in the Netherlands. Different topics are illuminated in this chapter. Firstly,
some aspects about the desiccation problem, which include soil chemistry, differences be-
tween the eastern and western part of the country, the involvement of the government, and
options against the problem, are discussed. Secondly, a short overview about the availability
of water in the Netherlands is given. Thirdly, the different user groups of water resources in
the Netherlands are described, and lastly, some facts about the special circumstances of high
density of economic activity in the Netherlands are mentioned.
Chapter 3 points out the economic attributes that are connected with water as a natural
resource. The focus is put on the optimal allocation and extraction of resource, the externality
problem, the special characteristics of water, and the theory about the optimal water pricing.
In chapter 4 different instruments about managing water scarcity as it is found in the
international literature are reviewed. Chapter 4 also pays attention to several criteria that have
to be considered while applying economic instruments. Furthermore, the pros and cons of the
different instruments will be examined.
In chapter 5 different economic instruments are tested for the application to the Dutch
situation. The instruments that have been selected are prices, tradable rights, effluent charges,
subsidies, taxes and restriction and quotas. The tests have been carried out on water use/ex-
traction of households and agriculture. Furthermore, the application of instruments on hydro-
logical measures is discussed.
Chapter 6 presents a quantitative specification of the competing interests between ag-
riculture and nature. It shows the estimation of the functions for five different crops that
describes the relationship between the crop yield and the groundwater table. Subsequently,
the optimal groundwater table for agriculture is calculated. Furthermore, a function for the
calculation of value of nature with respect to the groundwater table is introduced. For
finding an optimal groundwater table for both, agriculture and nature, the method of
equalizing marginal costs and benefits is used.
Chapter 7 completes with conclusions and recommendations.
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2. The water problem in the Netherlands
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to get familiar with the special characteristics of the water problem
in the Netherlands of which the desiccation problem is certainly a major element. Section 2.2
pays attention to the causes of desiccation, the chemical processes in the soil that create its
symptoms, the different characteristics of desiccation in the eastern and western part of the
country, governmental involvement, and to measures that can mitigate the problem. The am-
biguity about real water scarcity in the Netherlands is discussed in section 2.3, where some
facts and opinions about the availability of water are noted.
Many users with different interests are competing for water resources. On the one hand
there are offstream users who are withdrawing ground and surface water for agricultural and
industrial production processes and for municipal water supply. On the other hand there are
instream users who are interested in the maintenance of stream flows such as for fishery, na-
ture conservation, aesthetic values, navigation, hydropower, or waste water dilution. A
description of all different user categories in the Netherlands is given in section 2.4.
It is well known that there is high density of population and economic activity in the
Netherlands. Section 2.5 surveys some indicators about the problem of limited space in con-
nection with Dutch water management. Finally, section 2.6 gives some concluding remarks.
2.2 Desiccation
The activities that cause desiccation are already mentioned in the introduction. As a reminder
they are summarized in table 2.1. Additionally, the table shows the average groundwater table
lowering induced by the different activities.
Table 2.1 Different cctivities with their impact on groundwater table lowering and contribution to
desiccation

Activities Groundwater table lowering (cm) Contribution (%)

Land consolidation
Drainage and discharge of water 35 60
Groundwater extraction for drinking water and industry 10 - 100 30
Increase in crop evapotranspiration
Expansion of coniferous forests
Expansion of urbanized area 20 10

Source: Feddes et al, 1997; own adaptations.
18
Table 2.1 indicates that groundwater extractions can generate an enormous lowering of
the groundwater table. This is especially the case on certain spots where water demanding in-
dustries are established or where large amounts of drinking water have to be provided. As it is
described further down in this section, the impact of extractions is only important on local
level.
Chemical processes in the soil
Ecosystems that are especially sensitive to desiccation are characterized by upward seepage of
mineral-rich and nutrient-poor groundwater. Upward seepage occurs mainly in the transitional
regions between the high and low parts of the Netherlands (Feddes et al., 1997). It is the end
product of the rainwater that infiltrated into the soil on the high-situated parts after purifica-
tion and mineralization processes on the passage trough the soil. Desiccation means that the
moisture content of the soil declines. This, in turn, entails an increase of temperature and oxy-
gen concentration, which activates nitrogen mineralization and phosphate availability. The
result of these processes is eutrophication. Another consequence of a lowering of the ground-
water table is the decrease in upward seeping mineral-rich groundwater. Now, infiltrating
rainwater, which has the opposite characteristics than upward seepage, namely mineral-poor
and nutrient rich, let the pH-value of the soil decline and makes it to turn acid. The damage
that is generally ascribed to desiccation is thus actually the result of a combination of desicca-
tion, eutrophication and acidification (Feddes et al., 1997).
Differences between the Western and Eastern part of the country
The effects of a lowering of the groundwater table as it is described in the preceding para-
graph are mainly a problem in the eastern and southern parts of the country with their sandy
soils and their vulnerable high peat reserves. The main problems that occur in the western part
of the country are of a different character. Here, the decreasing pressure of fresh water that is
accompanied by a decreasing groundwater table brings about that salt water from the sea and
brackish water from the rivers intrudes into the groundwater reservoirs. This has negative ef-
fects for the drinking water extraction in this area. Furthermore, a decreasing groundwater
table induces a decline of the soil, which has destructive consequences for the foundation of
buildings. This dilemma turns out to be a vicious circle because the soil decline implies that
the groundwater table gets again closer to the surface. This, in turn, creates the need of a fur-
ther lowering of the groundwater table.
The area in the western part of the country where desiccation is mainly caused by the
extraction of groundwater is the area of the dunes. The groundwater reservoirs under the
dunes serve as freshwater supply for the big cities in the 'randstad'. Runhaar et al. (1997),
refering to Leeflang, mention that desiccation in the area of the dunes was already observed at
the end of the 19th century when groundwater was found to be a good water supply for the big
cities.
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Governmental actions
As a consequence of an extreme dry summer period in 1976 the Dutch government ac-
knowledged desiccation as a serious problem (Raad voor verkeer en waterstaat et al.,
1996). Therefore, the government took up desiccation in its plan for environmental policy.
The intentions are to reduce the area suffering from desiccation with 25% in the year 2000
and with 40% in the year 2010 with respect to the year 1985. In the meantime, however, it
is realized that the target reduction of 25% in 2000 cannot be reached. The actual decrease
of desiccation attainable in 2000 is estimated at 5-6% whereas a 25% reduction is only vi-
able in 2015 (Ministry of Transport and Public Works, 1996).
As mentioned in the introduction the characteristics and the degree of seriousness of
desiccation are not uniform in all affected areas. Therefore, the provinces play an impor-
tant role in controlling desiccation.
An important step is the establishment of the desired ground and surface water situa-
tion. The desired ground and surface water situation is to be determined by negotiations
between the provinces, the water boards and the people that administrate or make use of the
considered land, for instance environmental organizations and farmers.
Options against desiccation
Having in mind the activities that cause desiccation it is obvious that countermeasures to these
activities have to be taken. The options for controlling the problem are listed below (Feddes et
al., 1997; Projectteam Vierde Nota Waterhuishouding, 1996).
− Hydrological measures:
− conservation of water inside a region by active water management;
− temporary storage of precipitation surplus;
− reduction of drainage capacity;
− re-meandering of brooks;
− allowing more vegetation growth in ditches.
− Reduction and reallocation of groundwater extractions for drinking water and industries.
− Substitution of groundwater with surface water for drinking water supply;
− Replacement of dark coniferous forests with broad-leaf-wood.
From debates among experts (Wageningse Kennisdagen, 1998) it becomes clear that
hydrological measures that imply a reduction of drainage capacity and the conservation of
water in its original area are the dominant strategies in the discussion around desiccation. On
the other hand, reduction in groundwater extraction takes only a minor position.
The same opinion is shared by the association of Dutch drinking water suppliers
(VEWIN) who reveals their opinion about the relationship between municipal water use
and desiccation in the journal Duurzaam Bouwen (1998). Since groundwater extraction for
drinking water causes only 10% of the problem it is somewhat doubtful whether a reduc-
tion in municipal use of drinking water will have a significant contribution to the reduction
of desiccation. They argue that the problem is mainly the result of the polder creation.
Originally, rainwater that infiltrated on the hills near Utrecht seeped to the area that was
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then characterized by upward seepage because it was the lowest point in the region. The
creation of the polders in the Ijsselmeer entails that the lowest point was moved. Conse-
quently, the flowing groundwater passes its original destination and ends up in the polders.
Another study supporting the attitude that reduction of groundwater extraction is not
a proper measure against desiccation is done by Van Ee and Pakes (1994). They investi-
gate the benefit for nature as a result of a reduction in groundwater extraction in eastern
Brabant. Their main results are that a reduction of ten million m3 water induce an increase
in the value of nature with 0.3%. The costs for the water works sector that are combined
with this reduction are about 170 million guilders. Because the increase in the value of na-
ture is only marginal whereas the costs are very high, they conclude that it would be
advisory to think about measures with respect to changes in the water control system. The
evaluation of nature in this study is somehow questionable. They would probably come to
other results if they would take other standards or methods to find a value for nature.
The most recent study about anti-desiccation strategies is reported by Baltissen and Van
Der Sluis (1998). The results of this research indicate that in 69% of the research area hydro-
logical measures recovered more than 50% of the target situation. It is expected that through a
stop of groundwater extractions on specific places another 5% of recovery of nature can be
reached. An important point that was detected in this study is that a stop of groundwater ex-
traction is an additional option and only useful if hydrological rearrangements run parallel to
it. A stop of groundwater extraction without reducing the water discharge capacity of the
drainage system in the natural area does not have any effect on mitigating desiccation. Other
measures such as the replacement of coniferous forest through broad-leaf-wood and the de-
poldering of Flevoland only seem to give a restricted contribution.
Another option against desiccation that is often mentioned in the literature is the infil-
tration of non-local surface water on desiccated areas. This measure turned out to be not
effective because the quality of that water does not meet the demands of the desiccated areas'
ecosystem.
2.3 Availability of water
The OECD (1995) mentions in its report about environmental performances of its member
countries that the Netherlands are subject to both, an abundance and a shortage of fresh-
water resources. 70% of total fresh water supply is provided by the rivers Rhine and
Meuse. Most of this water is needed to flush out brackish groundwater and to push back
the intrusion of salt water from the sea. The other 30% are provided by precipitation and
little streams and brooks. The average amount of precipitation in the Netherlands is about
796 mm per year which is not enough to prevent water deficit during summer (OECD,
1995). Blumenthal (1988) summarizes that the main water management problem in the
Netherlands is to get rid of excess rainfall in winter and to distribute the available river
water over the country in summer, taking care that good quality of both surface and
groundwater is maintained.
Among the experts of the Dutch water sector rather different opinions can be found
about the degree of seriousness of water scarcity. The most contradictory judgements are cer-
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tainly done by Cals, who is the manager of the association of Dutch drinking water suppliers
(VEWIN), and by Saeijs, who is professor for water quality policies and sustainability at the
Erasmus University in Rotterdam. Cals expresses himself positive about the fresh water
situation. According to him drinking water is by no means a scarce commodity. He builds his
conclusion on the fact that drinking water consumption is stabilized at a level of about 130 li-
ters per capita per day since 1990. Additionally, he is pointing out that there is no question
about intensifying the extraction of groundwater. Due to technical innovation, so Cals, it will
get more favorable to purify surface water which is surly an inexhaustible resource in the
Netherlands (NRC, 20-11-97). Saeijs (1995) represents the other extreme. In his inaugural
speech in September 1995 he determined that the Netherlands belong with respect to fresh
water resources to the poorest countries in the world. He based his statement on the definition
of the poverty line for fresh water that was established on the Environmental Top Conference
in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. This poverty line is set at 1,000m3 per capita per year. He reasons
further that the annual amount renewable water from own sources per capita available in the
Netherlands is only 680m3 and therefore beneath the poverty line. Moreover, the Netherlands
are importing fresh water and are thus not self-sufficient which means that they depend on
foreign countries.
These two different views illustrate the wide range of attitudes towards this question
and it is obvious that they depend heavily on the academic background of the respective per-
son. Without doubt, every expert is able to defend his or her position. However, for a
sustainable development of the Dutch water resources integrated policy measures have to be
introduced.
Sustainability and integrated water management are also the main objectives in the
fourth policy document on water management in the Netherlands. The sustainability item
corresponds with the national environmental policy plan, which has the target that envi-
ronmental problems ought to be manageable by the year 2010 (Raad voor verkeer en
waterstaat et al., 1996). Integrated water management implies that every function of water
has to be taken into account equally. As far as possible, it should create adequate condi-
tions for the different user groups with their competing interests about the quality and
quantity of water to act next to or even with each other. Certainly, in some cases a combi-
nation of different functions of water is not possible, which means that the presence of one
user group excludes the presence of another user group. The different user groups of water
resources in the Netherlands are described in the following section.
2.4 Different functions of water
Although this study is focusing on water quantity items it has to be stressed that an economi-
cally efficient water management system has to integrate quantity as well as quality issues
(Howe et al., 1986). This statement is even more important in a situation such as the Nether-
lands where the space limit forces high density of economic activity with competing purposes
of water use. Figure 2.1 shows all the different user groups that benefit from the multifunc-
tional character of water (Ministry of Transport and Public Works, 1996). The dashed lines
between the categories of use are supposed to indicate their overall interrelationship meaning
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that every activity has effects on other activities. While discussing the different user catego-
ries remarks are made about their effects on desiccation.
Nature
The category nature represents all functions that are important for the continuation of biodi-
versity and the preservation of the natural composition of water, soil, and air. Because all
other categories are originated by human activity which is never without consequences for the
natural material cycle it can be stated that nature is the main opponent of all other categories.
Focusing on desiccation, water control measures for the benefit of agriculture, urbanization,
and security and groundwater extraction of agriculture, industry and drinking water compa-
nies are known to be the most important items that have to be taken under consideration. With
its recent 'Note on Environment and Economy the Dutch' government shows its intention for
the development of a sustainable economy in which economic growth is supposed to go hand
in hand with decreasing pressure on the environment (VROM et al., 1997). The sustainable
development issue is also found back in the 'National Policy Document on Water Manage-
ment', which put the ecological development of water systems such as the sustained use of it
by man, preservation of natural production, and diversity of species as its main target (Minis-
try of Transport and Public Works, 1989).
Figure 2.1 Different user categories of water in the Netherlands
Security
From a historical point of view security has always been the most important topic in Dutch
water management. To protect people from floods and extreme high tides it is necessary to
care for high enough dikes at river- and seaside and a fast enough run-off of superfluous wa-
ter. After the floods in 1993 and 1995 and with view on the rising sea level due to climatic
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changes the security item is still an emerging point on the agenda. For instance, in the 'Explo-
ration of Water Systems 1996' the Ministry of Transport and Public Works set security as a
definite starting point in water policy measures. Traditional water engineering takes straight-
ening, broadening and deepening of rivers and streams to increase discharge capacity as the
most appropriate way to provide flood protection. Under the overall target policy of a sustain-
able development of the Dutch economy new strategies of flood protection have became a
point of discussion. The most important strategies to approach a more ecological way of
dealing with water superfluity are spatial rearrangements that tend to conserve water in order
to reduce peaks of discharge. Such spatial rearrangements are the re-meandering of rivers and
streams, the transformation of agricultural land into natural area, and the creation of buffer
zones and inundation polders along water courses (VROM, 1997). Conserving water for a
longer time is also known as being a substantial contribution to the reduction of the desicca-
tion problem (VROM, 1997).
Urbanization
Water overload of rivers and streams is partly caused by increasing urbanization. The exten-
sion of cities and urban area entails an increase in concrete area that makes sure that rain
water is quickly led away through the canalization to the bigger rivers and streams. Next to
water overload urbanization contributes to the desiccation problem because rainwater that
runs away through the sewage system does not have enough time to percolate through the soil
to replenish the groundwater reservoir.
Agriculture
Agriculture makes use of water in nearly all-possible ways. Firstly, it demands special man-
agement of water control. In springtime the groundwater level has to be low enough such that
the soil can provide the necessary bearing strength for heavy machines that are needed for
land cultivation. Secondly, water is needed for irrigation in summer time in order to save the
crops from drought damage and for the cattle. This two purposes demand high quality water
especially with respect to salt contents and toxic elements. Thirdly, agriculture is putting
much pressure on water quality by leftovers of fertilizer and pesticides that are washed out of
the soil into groundwater reservoirs or that end up in ditches. Through the extensive network
of ditches, brooks and channels it cannot be avoided, that unwanted elements in surface water
spread out over the area very easily. The need of low as well as high groundwater tables and
the demand for high quality water on the one hand and the pollution of water on the other
hand makes it obvious that even inside one sector there are many contradictory interests. A
more detailed description of the role of water in agriculture can be found in chapter 6.
Drinking water
The main competitors of agriculture on quality level as well on quantity level are certainly
drinking water companies, nature, fishery, and recreation. All of them are interested in water
of good quality. Drinking water companies have to bear the costs of purification, which are
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substantially influenced by the pollution of pesticides and nitrate. The costs of purification of
pesticides are estimated to be about 200 million guilders per year and that of nitrate about 75-
130 million guilders per year (Ministry of Transport and Public Works, 1996).
Currently, 33% of drinking water is supplied by surface water and 67% is extracted
from groundwater (Ministry of Transport and Public Works, 1996). Regarding desiccation
and increasing demand for drinking water until the year 2000 it is planned that in the near fu-
ture more surface water will be used as substitution for groundwater supply. Because of
higher costs of purification that are connected with the supply of surface water it is predicted
that the price of drinking water will rise.
Industry
Industry needs water as instream uses such as for production processes, for the products
themselves, and for cooling and as offstream uses such as for the dilution of waste water. To-
tal water use of industry decreases between 1986 and 1991 with 28% from 4,300 million m3
to 3,100 million m3 (CBS, 1986 and 1991). This can be explained by the strict policy of the
'Pollution of Surface Water Act' from the late 80s which uses licensing and inspection of dis-
charges, combined with sanctions and penalties to improve water quality in order to induce
firms to treat and reuse waste water (OECD, 1995). However, groundwater extractions of
many industrial firms, especially in food industry, are to large extent responsible for desicca-
tion on local scale. This is because large amounts of groundwater are extracted from the same
spot.
Electricity
Electric power plants and industry uses most of the surface water for cooling purposes. The
pollution of surface water with warm water can have considerable effects on the living condi-
tions of local water life and therefore be harmful to nature, fishery and recreation. The
consequences of the warming of surface water are a decrease of the oxygen level, an intensi-
fied growth of algae, and botulism, which can all lead to mortality of fishes. A system of
licenses and norms are established for the discharge of cooling water that should care for the
avoidance of such negative effects. Anyway, it is still a problem to handle hot and dry periods
where the water run-off of the rivers is not strong enough to washout and dilute cooling water
(Ministry of Transport and Public Works, 1996).
Fishery
For fishery quantity and quality of water are the most essential inputs. Water pollution from
agriculture and industry has negative effects on the health condition of the fish stock. The
straightening and deepening of rivers and streams deteriorated the settlement possibilities of
migratory fishes such that they became very scarce or that they disappeared totally from their
original habitats. The spatial rearrangement measures to provide flood control discussed
above would surely have positive consequences for the variety of fish species, which in turn
would be beneficial for fishery provided that harvesting takes place in a sustainable way.
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Navigation
Navigation makes demand of an appropriate wide and deep enough waterway with a water
flow that should neither be too high or too low. The Ministry of Transport and Public Works
(1996) expects an increase in navigation with bigger ships in the near future. Although navi-
gation is by comparison with road and air transport regarded as being a rather clean way of
conveyance, the water pollution, especially of oil discharge and antifouling coating should not
be underestimated. These negative effects for fishery, recreation and nature have to be taken
into account while planning integrated water management.
Recreation
Recreation is an increasing sector in the Dutch economy. Water is needed for swimming,
sailing, fishing, and ice-skating or just as an element that cannot be missed in the typical
Dutch landscape enjoyed by walkers or bikers. Water quality aspects are certainly the most
important items in recreation because it directly effects the health of human beings enjoying
water activities or because an abnormal smell would be inconvenient for people. Quantity as-
pects become a point of discussion when talking about the extension of protected area for
special animals and plants that would be harmed by recreational activity in such areas.
2.5 The problem of limited space
The Netherlands are known for their high population density and agglomeration of economic
activity. This entails in many cases an additional pressure on environmental resources. The
question is now if limited space could be an extra obstacle that impedes the development of
an integrated plan for water management. Table 2.2 shows some general indicators for envi-
ronmental pressure in the Netherlands in comparison with European OECD countries and all
OECD countries.
From the figures in table 2.2 it becomes obvious that in the Dutch situation all indica-
tors that are reported per square kilometer reach a very high score compared to the average
value of other OECD countries. The density of economic activity is reflected in population
and GDP per km2, which are both more than four times higher than the average. The three in-
dicators representing agricultural activity, cattle and pigs, and use of fertilizer and pesticides,
indicate intensive production methods which are famous for being relevant contributors to
many water related environmental problems. The road vehicle stock and the road network
length show that transport facilities take an important role and may also be an indicator of the
degree of society's mobility, which is known to be quite high in the Netherlands. Furthermore,
also in waste per km2 and energy consumption (toe/1,000 US$ per unit GDP), the Netherlands
take the leading position. With regard to the space problem it is not amazing that the percent-
age of forest area is rather modest in contrast to the fellow OECD members. On the other
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Table 2.1 Indicators for environmental pressure in the Netherlands
Indicators for environmental pressure (1990-1992) Netherlands OECD (Europe) OECD
Population (inhabitants/km2) 407 98 27
GDP (million $/km2) 6.7 1.4 0.5
Cattle and pigs (head/km2) 549 52 15
Use of nitrogen fertilizer (tons/km2 of permanent crop land) 41.5 9.7 5.9
Use of pesticides (tons of active ingredients per km2
  of permanent crop land) 1.8 0.5 0.3
Road vehicle stock (vehicles/km2) 182 40 15
Road network length (km/km2 of land area) 3.5 0.8 0.4
Waste (tons/km2) 205 36 13
Energy consumption (toe/1,000US$ per unit GDP) 0.26 0.19 0.24
Forest area (% of total area) 9.9 33.4 33.2
Major protected area (% of total area) 9.5 6.9 7.8
Indicators for environmental pressure (1990-1992) Netherlands OECD (Europe) OECD
Withdrawal of freshwater resources (m3/capita/year) 517 628 1,073
Source: OECD Environmental Performance Review: The Netherlands, Paris, 1995.
hand the relative high percentage of major protected area indicates a strong interest in nature
conservation. However, Verbruggen (1995) mentioned that the absolute area of nature in the
Netherlands is not only small compared with other OECD countries but also very fragmented
and in a worrisome condition. As a matter of fact, the disintegrated structure of the natural
area is a major obstacle in curing desiccation (Baltissen and Van Der Sluis, 1998).
The last indicator noted in table 2.2 points out that the withdrawal of cubic meters
freshwater per capita per year is actually lower than the average. In connection with the high
population density this relative low level of water use is compensated by 407 inhabitants per
km2. It is therefore not difficult to conclude that high pressure is put on the Dutch freshwater
resources. (It should be mentioned that the high average value of all OECD countries, 1,073
m3/capita/year, is mainly influenced by the United States that have a withdrawal of freshwater
resources of 1,875 m3/capita/year.)
Limited space brings about that all the different users with their competing interests are
spatially very close to each other, which increases the severity of external effects produced by
one user on his/her competitors. A successful plan for integrated water management certainly
needs obligingness of all competitors and participation of society to take into account all con-
cerns and objectives.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter the role of water in the Netherlands has been explored. Desiccation is a major
reason why traditional management of the hydrological system, which implies high drainage
capacities for the benefit of agriculture, is called in question. The most important option
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against the desiccation problem is hence the rearrangement of the hydrological system such as
the conservation of water inside a region or the reduction of drainage capacity. The recovery
of the hydrological system is a measure that has an impact on regional scale. Among experts,
the reduction of groundwater extraction activities is only taken as a secondary option against
desiccation. However, on local scale, groundwater extraction can cause a groundwater table
lowering down to one meter below the original level and is therefore quite significant on spe-
cific locations. A successful policy against desiccation certainly has to consider that
circumstances and causes of the problem can differ from location to location. This implies
that there is no overall solution to the problem and that anti-desiccation strategies have to be
adapted to the local situation.
While talking about water scarcity in the Netherlands it is important to define the type
of water scarcity beforehand. The effort that has been put into getting rid of superfluous water
shows that there is no absolute water scarcity in the Netherlands. A problem appears with re-
spect to quality issues, which means that fresh groundwater resources are getting scarce.
Good quality water is scarce from an economic point of view because the purification of sur-
face water is still very expensive, at least more expensive than the extraction of groundwater,
which costs do not yet include the external effects that occur by the extraction and that be-
come visible as desiccation.
A special characteristic of the Netherlands is the high density of economic activity.
Several in- and offstream users with different demands on quality and quantity of water com-
pete for the resource on a spatially limited area. This could imply that external effects
produced by the different users on their competitors are more severe. With respect to the
withdrawal of freshwater per capita per year the Netherlands lie under the average of the other
OECD countries. This could be an indication that compared to the other OECD countries effi-
ciency of use is already relatively high in the Netherlands. However, the fact that a limited
area has only a limited underground area and therefore less space available for the storage of
groundwater in combination with high population density forces people to treat groundwater
resources even more efficiently as it is done already.
For a better understanding of the efficient use of water and the efficient allocation of
water among users the following chapter will describe some economic issues around water as
a natural resource.
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3. The economics of water
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter some basic principles about treating water as an economic good are explained.
Section 3.2 shows the concept of the optimal allocation of scarce resources and the theory of
the Hotelling Rule as a guideline for an optimal extraction of environmental resources. It was
already shown in the preceding chapter that the purposes of water use are manifold. Section
3.3 and 3.4 take up again this special characteristic of water and additionally pay attention to
the dilemma why water fails to be allocated in an optimal way. Section 3.5 gives some ideas
about the optimal pricing of water services. Section 3.6 finishes this chapter with some con-
cluding remarks.
3.2 The optimal allocation and extraction of water
There are two concepts that are important while talking about the optimal allocation of re-
sources: the concept of efficiency and the concept of optimality (Perman et al., 1996).
Efficiency is described by Vilfredo Pareto in 1897, who introduced the Pareto-criterion: a
particular allocation of resources is Pareto efficient if it is not possible to make anyone better
off without making at least one other person worse off. This implies that in a Pareto ineffi-
cient situation, positive gains to any person are possible without losses to others. An optimal
situation can be described as the state with the highest social welfare or in which the corre-
sponding social welfare function is maximized. An optimal arrangement is therefore
necessarily an efficient one. The crucial point is that the reverse is not true: An efficient allo-
cation is not automatically an optimal one. This is because there are numerous potential
Pareto-efficient allocations, all of them dependent on a certain initial distribution of factor en-
dowments.
For social welfare to be maximized, an economically efficient resource allocation re-
quires that marginal net benefits are equalized across all different users. An optimal allocation
of water resources is also established in the Dutch groundwater law (Van Staalduinen et al.,
1996). The marginal net benefit curve is defined as the vertical distance between the demand
curve for water and the marginal costs of extracting and distributing that water as it is de-
picted in figure 3.1 (Tietenberg, 1992).
Water use can be classified in different economic terms. On the one hand, water offers
benefits through direct use in final consumption such as in households or for environmental
and recreational purposes. On the other hand, it is used as an intermediate good in a produc-
tion process, e.g. irrigation, hydropower or cooling (Gibbons, 1986). In the latter application
the value of water has to be derived from the value of the final good. An optimal allocation of
water in different production processes can be achieved if its value of marginal product is
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equalized over all processes. Hence, the demand for water is a derived demand and depends
on the value of the good produced (Bogess et al., 1993). This relationship is presented in Fig-
ure 3.2.
Monetary
unit Demand curve Marginal cost curve
Quantity of water
Monetary
unit
Marginal net benefit curve
Quantity of water
Figure 3.1 Derivation of marginal net benefit curve
While talking about the optimal allocation of water it is important to distinguish be-
tween surface water and groundwater. Surface water has the characteristics of a renewable
resource and its future supply depends mainly on natural phenomena whereas the future sup-
ply of groundwater is dominantly influenced by current withdrawal and the aspect of
intertemporal allocation has to be taken into account as well (Tietenberg, 1992). Depletion of
groundwater occurs when the extraction rate continuously exceeds the recharge rate. A
groundwater aquifer can become irreversibly used up if the geological pattern of its supply
channels is such that they need a certain minimum water level to keep on functioning and the
provision of this minimum level is not guaranteed because of excessive withdrawal (Neher,
1990).
3.2.1 The optimal extraction of exhaustible resources
A rule for the intertemporally efficient extraction of exhaustible resources under the assump-
tion of maximization of social welfare was developed by Hotelling in 1931 (Perman et al.,
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1996). It states that the rate of change of the resource's shadow price has to be equal to the so-
cial utility discount rate. In mathematical form it can be expressed as:
ρ=
t
t
P
dt/dP
(3.1)
Where: Pt = shadow price of the resource at time t
ρ = social utility discount rate.
Monetary unit
MFC1 = w1
Derived demand curve for water
MFC2 = w2
VMP1
VMP2
Q1 Q3 Q2 Water for production process
Figure 3.2 The Demand for water in a production process
Source: Bogges et al., 1993.
VMP1 is the initial value of marginal product curve and depicts the demand for water at
different prices. Microeconomic theory says that in a profit maximizing enterprise the value
of marginal product equates marginal factor costs (p*∂y/∂q = ∂C/∂q). If the enterprise is a
price taker, marginal factor costs correspond to the price of one unit of the resource that is
used as input (p*∂y/∂q = ∂C/∂q = w). This means that the value of the additional production
caused by one more unit of input matches the additional costs that arise from the use of one
more unit of input respectively its price. In figure 3.2, w1 is the original input price with the
corresponding demand for water Q1. After a price decrease to w2 the producer will expend
his/her demand to Q2. If the reduced price is available to many producers of the same good
and they will all increase their production, the extended supply will induce a decline in output
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price, which in turn has an effect on the value of marginal product. The new VMP is lower
than in the initial situation and in the figure it is represented by VMP2. With the new input
price w2 and the new value of marginal product VMP2, the producers will adjust their input
demand to the quantity Q3. The derived demand curve for water after one adjustment is
shown in the figure. It may have another non-linear form if more adjustments, which depend
on various aspects such as elasticity of supply or price flexibility, would take place. (The
derivation of Hotelling's Rule can be found in appendix A.)1
The price is the net price that means after subtracting costs of extraction and purifica-
tion. After rearranging and integrating (3.1), another form of Hotelling's Rule can be obtained:
Pt = P0 eρ t (3.2)
Formula 3.2 shows more clearly that the current price Pt rises at a rate equal to the so-
cial discount rate ρ. The rising price of the resource reflects the increasing scarcity of the
declining stock. If the price reaches the point where it is cheaper to use a substitute, the ex-
traction of the resource might be ceased before it is fully depleted. The substitute is called the
backstop technology and the price at which it is introduced is the choke price because at this
point resource extraction is choked off (Perman et al., 1996).
3.2.2 The optimal extraction of renewable resources
In the case of renewable resources Hotelling's Rule needs some modification (Perman et al.,
1996). Here the growth or, with respect to water, recharge rate has to be considered as well. It
is assumed that the amount of growth/recharge Ω is a function of the current stock level St,
hence Ω(St). The supplemented Hotelling rule can be described by:
dP/dt = ρP - PΩS (3.3)
Where: ΩS = dΩ/dS.
In words, ΩS is the rate of change in growth/recharge with respect to a change in the re-
source stock. While extracting or harvesting a renewable resource a steady-state should be
reached. A steady-state means that all stocks and flows of the renewable resource remain con-
stant over time which implies that the rate of extraction should always be equal to the
growth/recharge rate. Additionally, in a steady-state demand for the resource is constant over
time and therefore, with a constant rate of extraction, the price will stay unchanged as well.
Hence, in (3.3) dP/dt becomes zero and (3.3) reduces to
ρ = ΩS (3.4)
                                                
1 If the assumption is not the maximization of social welfare but maximization of private profit the social
utility discount rate is replaced by the market interest rate i. These two rates are in fact identical if profit
maximization takes place under the assumption of perfect competition and if the area under the demand curve
is identified as gross benefit (see Perman et al., 1996, p. 152).
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This equality says that extraction of the resource should be such that the
growth/recharge rate matches the social utility discount rate.
It should be mentioned that the conditions that are presented in equation (3.1)-(3.4) are
most basic specifications. Variations such as population growth, technical progress, extraction
and damage costs can be introduced in order to approach a more complex reality.
3.3 Water: a common property resource
Water has characteristics that prevent an optimal allocation. The most important one is cer-
tainly that it belongs to the common property resources and experiences therefore the
treatment that is known as the tragedy of the commons. In the case of groundwater, Gisser
and Sanchez (1980) classified the pumping of an aquifer between the harvesting of privately
owned timber and the exploitation of fishing grounds. Privately owned timber, where non-
owners are excluded, will be cut in such a way that profit is maximized over time, taking into
account the discounted value of future timber cutting. On the other hand, the non-
exclusiveness of fishing grounds implies that everyone wants to harvest the fish before any-
one else does it and this leads to dissipation of rent and inefficient application of effort over
time. A groundwater aquifer is to some extent attached with exclusiveness because only the
users that are situated above this aquifer are able to extract from it. However, this sort of ex-
clusiveness does not prevent the users from disregarding the value of water in situ because
conservation of one person does not have any effect if the others continue extracting.
Market forces can only attain an optimal allocation if property rights are fully assigned
and if all goods and services are private. Furthermore, the use of water produces externalities
whose costs are not incorporated in the price and are therefore passed on to society. The social
costs of water use are therefore higher than the private costs. This is portrayed in figure 3.3 at
the hand of an example of a private producer who is using water as input for production.
As mentioned above the private producer will demand the quantity of water that corre-
sponds to a situation where the price of water is equal to the private marginal costs. Say that
the water price is established at P*, then the producer will demand the quantity QP. If the
same condition shall hold for social marginal costs (P* = SMC), the quantity demanded has to
be reduced to QS. The triangle a-b-c is the amount of external environmental costs that have to
be borne by the society. The implications for the introduction of the optimal environmental
tax will be discussed further down in section 4.4.7.
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Figure 3.3 Social and private marginal costs
3.4 The special characteristics of water
Young (1986) summarizes some supply and demand characteristics that distinguish water
from other commodities:
− mobility: since water flows, evaporates, seeps, and transpires it is difficult to identify and
measure. This makes the establishment of property rights problematic;
− economies of large scale: due to large storage and distribution systems water supply has a
large fixed costs component and is hence predestined for being a natural monopoly;
− uncertainty in supply: water supply depends on stream flows and precipitation and is vari-
able in time, space and quality. It is therefore not foreseeable in a precise way. In general,
supply peaks do not coincide with periods of high demand;
− assimilating and absorbing capacities: water does also serve as a host for waste water and
pollutants. The assimilative capacity of a water body could therefore be seen as an addi-
tional commodity itself. This characteristic reminds that quality and quantity items are
very close connected to each other;
− diversity of use: water is used for numerous purposes in different user categories. For
some uses it is difficult to establish an economic value, which complicates the derivation
of utility that different users gain from different forms of water application.
3.5 Water pricing
In accordance with Randall (1981) water can be defined in terms of resource costs, opportu-
nity costs or social costs. Resource costs reflect the provision of water as, for instance,
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pumping or distribution costs; opportunity costs represent the value of that water in its best
alternative use; and social costs are costs that society has to bear such as costs arising from
externalities. In an efficient situation the three marginal costs are equalized and at the same
time they are pointing out the proper price. Randall's recommendation corresponds to the fun-
damental concept of economically efficient use of resources, the marginal costs pricing
system (Frederick and Kneese, 1995). Because of increasing marginal costs in most common
situations the marginal costs pricing system needs a progressive tariff structure which implies
higher charges at higher units of consumption (Winpenny, 1994). At present however, the op-
posite, namely special-offer charges for bulk users, is in many cases a matter of course.
The OECD (1987) suggests that marginal cost pricing under the User-Pays Principle
(UPP) would be the proper charging system to prevent inefficiency. The UPP is analogous to
the well-known Polluter-Pays Principle (PPP). Whereas under the PPP the polluter has to pay
for the external costs that he/she enforces upon society, the UPP prescribes that the users of
the services have to bear the full costs of the service collectively. Subsequently a charging
system that reflects quality and quantity items will divide full costs among all users. The UPP
certainly implies the abolition of subsidies to users of the water service.
Unfortunately, the marginal costs pricing system is not found in practice. In general,
water companies apply a system to recover the costs of treatment and delivery (Randall, 1981;
Tietenberg, 1992; Winpenny, 1994; Rosegrant, 1997), which means that they only take into
account the resource costs (see above). The rate-setting structure often takes the form of aver-
age cost pricing, where the water service is charged at average costs, or flat rate tariffs, where
the price is not directly based on the quantity of water used but on, for instance, number of
residents, number of tabs, size of inflow pipe or the property value. (For further details of rate-
settings, see OECD (1987); They give a very clear and detailed description of the different
price and tariff structures that are found in the water service sector).
Tietenberg (1992) mentions the consequences of inappropriate water pricing for migra-
tion. He notes that tariffs that are set too low would make arid region financially more
interesting to new residents than they really are. An increase in population in such areas
would put even more pressure on the limited water resources. The question arises if this
statement counts for independent private people and if they would make the price of water as
an important criterion of their decision to move to an arid region. In most cases people mi-
grate because of reasons of employment. Therefore, the settlement of industries and big
employers should be aggravated in such areas.
3.6 Conclusions
Water belongs to the common property resources and experiences the tragedy of the com-
mons. An important characteristic of water is its diversity of use. Water fulfils numerous
functions for different economic activities. Externalities that arise from the use of water by
these activities indicate that the price for water use paid by the different users does not enclose
the full costs. As a consequence, the market fails to allocate water in an optimal way and
overuse and waste of water are inevitable.
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The following chapter describes several economic instruments that assist in internaliz-
ing external effects and correcting market failure. Research on these instruments has been
carried out by consulting international literature about managing water scarcity.
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4. Economic instruments for managing water scarcity
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents several economic instruments that are applied to economize water use in
countries where water shortage has become a serious problem. The objective of economic in-
struments is to influence the demand behavior of water users. They are hence aimed at the
demand side of the water chain. Section 4.2 gives insight into the differences between supply
and demand management and the theory that demand management is an inevitable conse-
quence of supply management. Next, section 4.3 presents an overview of different policy
measures and different criteria that have to be taken into account while applying these meas-
ures. The following sections (4.4, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7) explain the different policy measures that
are introduced in section 4.3 in further detail. Special attention is paid to section 4.5. This
section describes the markets-based incentives for saving water. Market-based incentives are
those instruments that use market forces to approach an optimal allocation. Finally, section
4.8 gives some concluding remarks.
4.2 Demand versus supply management
In literature the problem of water shortage is in general approached in two different ways: 1)
through supply management or 2) through demand management. Rosegrant (1997) defines
supply and demand management as follows: 'Supply management, which involves activities to
locate, develop and exploit new sources of water, and demand management, which addresses
the incentives and mechanisms that promote water conservation and efficient use of water'.
Supply management is thus focusing mainly on quantity and quality of water at the entry
point of the distribution system while demand management applies to actions that influence
the use or wastage of water on the other side of the distribution system. Winpenny (1994)
uses the term supply augmentation instead of supply management. He argues that supply-side
solutions are unsustainable because they are increasingly costly and are going to face hydro-
logical, environmental and financial limits sooner or later. In other words, it is not possible to
fight a cause with its own symptom. A shift towards demand management, which induces
treating water more like a commodity and not like an automatic public service, is therefore in-
evitable. Randall (1981) interprets supply and demand management as two different segments
of a continuum. He introduced the term of maturing water economies, which includes two
phases: the expansionary and the mature phase. The expansionary phase refers to supply
management and is characterized by a policy that is concerned about an appropriate rate of
expansion and subsidization of the water economy. Generally, during this stage long-run wa-
ter supply is elastic, competition among different users of water is minimal, delivery systems
are in good condition, externality problems are not striking and social costs of subsidizing in-
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creased water use are fairly low. As the water economy is moving towards the mature phase
these features are changing. Long-run water supply becomes inelastic, competition among
different users is increasingly intense, delivery systems are aging and in need of expensive re-
pairs and renovation, externality problems are getting urgent and social costs of subsidization
are high and even rising. Due to this changes the value of water increases and benefits can be
achieved by reallocating water resources. In the mature phase of the water economy supply
management transformed into demand management.
Putting more emphasis on demand management does not mean that supply manage-
ment should be totally ignored. According to Alfred Marshal who is cited by Winpenny
(1994), 'supply and demand are the two blades of a pair of scissors'. In many situations new
supply schemes have to be introduced, but it is always important to take the demand man-
agement policies equivalently into account in order to avoid the mistakes from the past, where
supply side approaches dominated water resource practices (FAO, 1995).
In the following sections different policy measures for tackling the problem of water
scarcity are described. The focus is put on the demand management side because this is where
efficiency improvements through economic instruments can be achieved.
4.3 Different policy measures: an overview and criteria
Based on Rosegrant (1997) and Winpenny (1994) the following scheme of policy instruments
for managing the demand of water has been developed.
Table 4.1 Different policy measures for water management
Enabling conditions Market-based Non-market-based Direct interventions
(4.4) incentives (4.5) incentives (4.6) (4.7)
Institutional and Pricing reform Restrictions (4.6.1) Conservation
  legal changes (4.5.1)   programs
Reform of water Tradable rights and Quotas and Licences Leak detection and
  rights Water markets (4.5.2) (4.6.2)   repair programs
Privatization of Effluent or pollution Public information Water efficient user
  utilities   charges (4.5.3)   and education (4.6.3)   appliances
Macroeconomic and Water banks (4.5.4) Industrial recycling
  sectoral policy Auctions (4.5.5)
Subsidies (4.5.6)
Taxes (4.5.7)
Source: Winpenny, 1994; own adaptations.
Before describing especially the market and non-market based policy measure in detail
it should be mentioned that a certain instrument does not have to be taken as a single choice.
Anderson et al. (1977) brought up that any environmental control strategy has to be concerned
about conflicting interests in society and has to be aware of the ups and downs of a modern
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mixed economy. Every control strategy can therefore be subject to criticism for many reasons.
Bressers (1989) recommended that instruments should consider the purposes, the information
and the power of the government agency and should regard the addressed target group. They
are only able to contribute to a better environment if they are adjusted to the circumstances
under which they are applied. The different instruments are therefore not different option but
have to be combined to reinforce each other. This implies that an optimal policy mix has to be
constructed conforming to the particular circumstances and economic situations in the various
countries, such as the level of economic development, institutional capability, relative water
scarcity and level of agricultural intensification (Rosegrant, 1997).
Furthermore there are some criteria that have to be taken into account while choosing
the best way of water planning (Winpenny, 1994).
Efficacy/effectiveness
This criterion can be seen as the elasticity of response to different instruments. A combination
of measures, such as higher charges joined with campaigns of public information and educa-
tion and subsidies for the introduction of water saving technologies, will be in most cases the
most effective.
Efficacy is associated with the criterion of acceptability (which will be discussed under
point 7 in this section) because policy measures will have the highest pay-off if society ac-
cepts them.
Economic efficiency
For a policy measure to be efficient it is required that its discounted economic benefits exceed
its discounted costs. The efficiency principle was already discussed in 2.2 but it is worth to
mention again that the re-allocation among users such that water moves to higher-value uses
is essential to gain an optimal solution.
Equity and distributional effects
Equity can be reached in an undistorted market through trading from lower to higher-value
applications. As soon as the market gets distorted through for instance subsidized inputs or
protectionism in crop prices, equity is not guaranteed any longer. Instruments should be fair
with respect to their impacts on the various socio-economic groups. It is often recognized that
groups with less influence get low priority in the provision of public water services. The eq-
uity criterion is often contradictory to the economic efficiency criterion, which is only
concerned with the magnitudes of benefits and costs and not their distribution (Colby Saliba,
1987). Although, in theory, efficiency improvement through reallocation should lead to a
higher net social benefit, some groups that do not have anything to trade with (money, water
rights, political power and legal power to impose transaction costs) will suffer losses if no
compensation payments are taking place.
Colby Saliba (1987) also enters upon third-party impacts, instream flow uses and water
quality considerations. She argued that policies that take these features into account are indu-
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bitably expensive and their costs must be deliberated against the value of what these particular
policies want to achieve. However, the valuation of consumptive uses is much easier than
evaluating instream flows and quality changes and policy makers incline to favor water uses
whose values can be easily assessed.
Public health and nutrition
The World Bank warned that over one thousand people are in need of safe water supply and
proper sanitation (FAO, 1995). Hundreds of million of people who suffer from intestine dis-
eases due to lack of hygiene would benefit if a general improvement in water supply and
sanitation would take place. Especially in developing countries where the infrastructure of the
water system is not as obvious as in the developed (industrialized) countries, this criterion is
very important.
With respect to the national nutrition level in developing countries, it could be well ad-
vised to introduce policy measures supporting local irrigated farming in order to enhance food
security of the local population.
Environmental impact
Consideration of the environmental criterion got more importance in the recent years only.
The increasing significance of environmental impacts is the reason why demand management
measures are getting more popular. They reduce the environmental costs arising from the de-
velopment of supply projects, which used to be favored in water management decisions.
Fiscal impact
It is beyond question that every policy measure should have a positive net impact on the fi-
nances of the central or local government, the water utilities and the irrigation agencies. For
instance, positive effects such as taxes, higher water prices and charges should more than
outweigh negative effects such as subsidies or tax relief.
Political and public acceptability
As already mentioned under 1) acceptability is combined with efficacy. The factors that de-
termine acceptability are the distribution of costs and benefits, the severity of the problem, the
educational level of the population, the role of prominent political and community figures and
the readiness for behavioral change in society. A policy measure that gets support from the
target groups involved is more likely to be implemented than one that run into severe resis-
tance of the affected parties.
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Sustainability
The most sustainable policies are those that have an increasing positive long-run effect. They
consist of elements that reinforce each other such that their impact is continuos and growing
over time.
Short-term measures have a strong instantaneous effect. They are introduced in a case
of emergency such as a drought when quick action is required. They loose their impact when
emergency is over.
Administrative feasibility
This criterion refers to the government's capability to administer, enforce and monitor its cho-
sen policy measure. In the case of water pricing for instance, it has to be kept in mind that it
requires quite a lot of staff and organization that is connected with the metering and the col-
lection of revenues. Moreover, there must be a willingness and ability to prosecute non-
payers.
Macroeconomic environment
Agricultural and food policy measures on macroeconomic level can be supporting as well as
discouraging for water conservation policies. If, for instance, prices of water intensive crops
are subsidized and protected, it will be more difficult to let farmers' behavior change towards
crops that use water more efficiently. Therefore, liberalization could have in many cases a
positive effect on water policies.
4.4 Enabling conditions
The term 'enabling conditions' or 'enabling environment' describes the creation of a general
basis for encouraging a more economically rational use of resources through a change in the
institutional, legal and economic framework within which this resource is supplied (Win-
penny, 1994). According to Young (1986) the surrounding circumstances should not be
underestimated. He proclaims that the choice of institutions to co-ordinate economic activity
is among the most fundamental of social decisions.
Enabling conditions build in most cases the conditions that are necessary for the intro-
duction of other instruments. For instance, in the literature about the introduction of water
markets in several countries it becomes obvious that the government has to check in what way
its new policy conforms to the existing legislature and to what extent a law making process
has to be carried out. Some examples of legal issues that are important for water markets are
the security of water rights, certain rules in case of a conflict, the question whether water
rights may be transferred separately from land, or the management of third party effects,
which are return flows, changed groundwater levels and changed water quality (FAO, 1995).
A further explanation of water markets can be found below in section 4.5.2.
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Since water supply systems have a high fixed-costs-component, they have the charac-
teristics of a natural monopoly and are therefore predestined to be in public hands. However,
different forms of privatization of which total private ownership is the most extreme one are
alternatives to increase efficiency. An often-used example of privatization is the French water
sector (Dijkgraaf et al., 1997). In the French model two different forms of contracts between
the authority and private firms exist. One is the lease contract where only the operational
tasks such as extraction, purification, wastewater treatment and discharging are privatized but
the waterworks system and the installations are still property of the authority who is also re-
sponsible for necessary investments. Lease contracts are short-term contracts and are the most
common.
The other form is called concession contracts. They are long-term contracts and are
more rare than lease contracts. They can last up to 50 years and the private company is fully
responsible for maintenance and investments. After expiration of the contract all property
rights go to the government and the private owner gets a compensation payment if the in-
vestments are not depreciated. A reason why these contracts are less frequent is that they can
only be done when new installations or waterworks systems have to be built. A major disad-
vantage of this system is that the controlling and regulating parties are widely spread over
different levels of administration, such that the introduction of country wide standard regula-
tions as, for instance, prices or environmental issues, might cause some problems with respect
to organization and costs.
4.5 Market-based incentives
4.5.1 Pricing reforms
As already mentioned in section 3.4, a marginal cost pricing system would contribute to an ef-
ficient allocation of water. The introduction of marginal cost pricing implies that users have to
pay a higher price, which is also reflecting opportunity and social costs. The effect of a price
increase on water demand depends on its price elasticity. Pricing measures can only have a
positive influence on water conservation if the elasticity of demand is significantly different
from zero and negative. Several estimates about price elasticities can be found literature and it
becomes obvious that they vary widely according to sector (industry, agriculture and munici-
palities), utilization (indoor or outdoor), country and season (Gibbons, 1986; OECD, 1987).
They are mainly situated in the inelastic range of the demand curve, which means that they
have values between zero and minus one. It is a wide spread opinion that the pricing instru-
ment is not very effective because of the low price elasticity water demand, which implies a
minor response to price changes. For example, Martin and Kulakowsi (1991) conclude on the
base of an empirical research on urban water use in Tucson, Arizona, that the water price
would have to be raised by the rate of inflation plus the rate of change in income each year if
water use were to remain constant instead of increase. The problem with their argument is that
it is based on estimations calculated from existing water prices, which are obviously too low.
Estimation based on higher prices that reflect the real costs of supply, would probably show
that the demand curve would become more elastic.
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In order to be able to register and control consumption of the different users an essential
condition for water tariffs being a successful instrument for water conservation is metering.
Young and Haveman (1985), refering to estimates of Mexican irrigation water of Schramm
and Gonzales and of urban water use of Hanke and Gysi, point out that the introduction of a
metering system combined with volumetric charges has significant impacts on consumption.
A similar result is found by the OECD (1987) in its examination of pricing of water and re-
lated services, which declares that the introduction of volumetric charges create notable
reductions in demands and consequently economic and environmental benefits. However, the
OECD (1987) concludes that the final decision of introducing a metering system will depend
on its costs and benefits. Therefore the OECD introduced in the same publication a metering
decision rule:
The costs of metering (M) consist of the provision of the installation, the maintenance
and the additional reading, billing and collection costs on top of the existing charging system.
It is assumed that consumers reduce their water use as a consequence of metering. Therefore,
another cost component is the value of consumption of water forgone (U), which is equal to
the area under the demand curve. The benefits (B) are calculated by means of the annual re-
duction in water demands by the users (R) multiplied by the marginal costs of supply and
disposal (C). Furthermore it is assumed that metering of all users will provide useful informa-
tion with respect to the improvement in demand forecasting and wastewater reduction
techniques (I). With these variables the metering decision rule can be defined:
M + U < B + I (4.1)
Where: B = R*C
Obviously, it will be worth to introduce metering if its costs plus the forgone benefit of
water consumption are smaller than the benefits plus the value of the additional information.
By means of the metering decision rule the influence on the water-planing criterion of fiscal
impact can be calculated.
With respect to equity the pricing instrument can be approached from two sides
(OECD, 1987). On the one hand metering is recognized as fair because everyone pays exactly
the amount that he/she used. On the other hand it is criticized that poorer members of the so-
ciety are at disadvantage because they have to spend relatively more of their income on water,
which is, as stated by the United Nations, a basic need and everyone should have the right to
its provision. To guarantee equity it is important to develop a charging system that considers
income classes, disadvantaged regions and user categories (OECD, 1987). The danger of the
complexity of such a charging system is that it may become too difficult for consumers to un-
derstand. This may have consequences on public acceptability with negative effects on the
effectiveness of price measurements.
Without a doubt, the introduction of an effective metered charging system needs a lot of
research, planning and investment. But for an efficient market where prices are supposed to
be a signal of real scarcity, the effort that has to be made in the beginning will be worthwhile
in the future.
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4.5.2 Tradable rights and water markets
Tradable rights and water markets emerged in areas where water scarcity became very severe
and new supplies were not so easy to discover. A fair amount of literature is published on this
topic of which most cases are situated in the southwestern part of the United States, Australia,
Chile and the Middle East. Becker (1995) reports from Israel that the stimulus to introduce a
water market arose from the fact that investments in institutional changes that are necessary
for a proper functioning of the market appear to be cheaper than investments in developing
new supplies such as import or desalination installations. The most important condition to be
introduced for a successful working of a water market is that property rights are secure and
well established (Gazmuri Schleyer and Rosegrant, 1996).
If water becomes a marketable good, a transfer of water from lower to higher value ap-
plication will be set in motion. It will stop if the marginal benefit of all applications is equal.
This mechanism is illustrated in figure 4.1.
Say that the total amount of water that can be traded is 1,000m3 and that the initial dis-
tribution of water rights is set at point I, where user A owns 300 units of water rights and user
B owns 700 units of water rights. In this situation the marginal benefit of user A (λA) exceeds
the marginal benefit of user B (λB) by the distance λA-λB. If B offers A one more unit of water
rights at a price that is higher than λB but lower than λA, both users would gain. A would gain
the difference between its own marginal benefit curve and any price between λB and λA. The
same counts for B. This procedure can be continued until point E is reached where marginal
benefit of A and B are at the same level. E is also the point where joint benefit of both users is
maximized. In the initial situation A's total benefit is the quadrangle a-b-I-c, B's total benefit
is the quadrangle d-f-g-I and joint total benefit is the area a-b-d-f-g-c. Moving towards the
optimal situation at point E let joint benefit increase by the shaded triangle b-E-d.
In this simple example with only two participants overall benefit can be maximized by
trading. In reality, however, it is often criticized that water markets will have negative effects
on third parties. The problem of the third party effects was already taken up while discussing
the equity criterion. It is remarked that instream uses that are difficult to evaluate are often ne-
glected because its interest groups do not have enough purchasing power.
Gazmuri Schleyer and Rosegrant (1996) who investigated the Chilean water market
demonstrate an example of a good functioning water market. They emphasize that the posi-
tive picture of the Chilean water market owes much to its legal and institutional framework. It
is found that there are strict laws for the protection from adverse third-party effects, for water
user organizations and for solving conflicts if these cannot be solved by the organizations
themselves. Another success supporting item is the decoupling of water from land. This
regulation makes it possible for the farmers to sell water to urban users. This is a quite lucra-
tive trade for the farmers and it stimulates them even more to increase efficiency in their
production processes.
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Marginal Marginal
benefit A benefit B
a f
b
λA
E
λX
λB d
c g
I X A's water use
0 1,000m3
300 500
B's water use
1,000m3 0
700 500
Figure 4.1 The mechanism of tradable rights
Source: Perman et al., 1996, adapted to water rights.
Because of the fact that water is a heterogeneous good, water markets have to be diver-
sified with respect to different qualities and different purposes of use. Spulber and Sabbaghi
(1994) state that water can be seen as a group of differentiated products for different purposes
traded in different markets at different prices. Such a system would give complete information
to all market participants and authorities. Colby et al. (1993) also enters upon price dispersion
in water markets. On the base of empirical analysis they conclude that the price of water
rights additional to the heterogeneity criterion is closely related to the geographic area and the
characteristics of the local market, the size of the transaction, the number and size of potential
traders and the information and searching costs that are involved in the transaction.
The high demand for regulatory and administrative institutions is often criticized to be a
major disadvantage of water markets. However, if a supporting institutional framework is
guaranteed, water markets with secure property rights can be a good approach to achieve an
efficient allocation and to stimulate investments in water-saving technologies (Gazmuri
Schleyer, Rosegrant, 1996).
In order to bring water markets into line with modern forms of communication, internet
and e-mail can surly not be left out of consideration in the future. Olmstead et al. (1997) re-
port about the application of WaterLink, the first electronic water market system. This pioneer
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system has been established in the Westlands Water District in California and it enables water
users to buy and sell water rights with their home computers. WaterLink contains weekly and
seasonal market statistics on the number and volume of transactions, the average trading
price, rainfall summaries and water storage levels. Olmstead et al. conclude that electronic
water systems will definitely improve the efficiency of water markets because they are able to
reduce the high information, searching and negotiation costs that are often criticized as being
a major obstacle in water trading.
4.5.3 Effluent or pollution charges
Although this instrument is actually placed in the category of water quality improvement it
also has influence on the quantity of water used. Effluent and pollution charges are imposed
to internalize the costs arising from the environmental damage caused by the discharge of (in-
dustrial) wastewater. If these charges are set high enough, industries are encouraged to invest
in their own wastewater treatment and recycling plants in order to reduce costs. Recycling and
reuse of wastewater consequently implies that the demand for fresh water decreases. If this
measure were combined with higher water prices for industries or subsidies for the installation
of recycling plants the incentive to reuse wastewater would be even stronger. It should be
mentioned that attention should be paid to the distribution of subsidies. In some cases subsi-
dies could cause inefficiently working companies to stay in business. (More about subsidies
can be found in section 3.4.6.).
4.5.4 Water banks
A bank is an institution where goods that are abundant at present can be stored for future use.
Water banking in its simplest form means that surface water that is not needed now is con-
ducted to an area where it can percolate to recharge an aquifer. In times when surface water is
scarce this groundwater can be pumped up again in order to meet demand (Winpenny, 1994).
The most mentioned example of water banking is that of the establishment of a water bank in
California in 1991 as a consequence of the latest drought where the state had the major re-
sponsibility for water transfers. According to Keller et al., who is cited by Winpenny (1994) a
water bank is an effective short-term emergency instrument. The long-term effects of water
banking are not very clear because there is not yet enough experience in this field. The obser-
vations made in California show that next to the state-controlled water banks there are also a
lot of private-controlled water transfers taking place which may appear to be more appropriate
ones (Isreal and Lund, 1995).
Using water banking as an instrument against desiccation is dubious because it implies
that non-local water is infiltrated into a groundwater aquifer whose water may have different
characteristics.
4.5.5 Auctions
Water auctions are not very common. Some examples can be found in the USA (Victoria
State), Spain and Australia (Winpenny, 1994). It is exclusively used for the distribution of
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water among farmers. For an auction to be sensible it is necessary that the water under con-
sideration is fully controlled by the water authority and that no other users can dispose of it. In
an auction a minimum price is established and subsequently the person who can bid the high-
est price for a specific amount of water will have it at his/her disposal. Theoretically, this
mechanism could lead to an efficient allocation of that water but in practice it is often realized
that part of the bidders made engagements with each other beforehand such that the allocative
mechanism was undermined by monopsonistic behavior (Winpenny, 1994).
4.5.6 Subsidies
In the framework of water management measures there are two ways of dealing with subsi-
dies. Firstly, there are the subsidies on water consumption that fail to give a clear sign of real
scarcity to consumers with the result of excessive consumption and secondly there are the
subsidies that intent to support firms in the investment of water saving technologies. Beyond
dispute, the subsidies in the first case have a negative effect on an efficient allocation of wa-
ter. Subsidized water can be found in all user categories. Especially in developing countries
the basic-need criterion of water causes that municipal water facilities are highly subsidized,
such that water can be provided at a lower price. Subsidized irrigation water in agriculture
leads to uneconomic applications on low value crops and it raises the possibility that farmers
irrigate just to calm their conscience. This fact will be supported if recent investments in irri-
gation installations with high fixed costs have been made and variable costs are low due to the
subsidization of water.
The second application of subsidies is a bit ambiguous. On the one hand they are sup-
posed to have a positive effect on water conservation because they should encourage firms to
invest in water saving technologies (including wastewater treatment facilities for recycling
and reuse as mentioned earlier). On the other hand there is also substantial criticism attached
to this kind of subsidies. Baumol and Oates (1975) point out that uncontrolled granting of
subsidies would attract new firms into a business which would more than off-set the reduction
of water use that is attained by single firms. Another item is noted by Hommes and van 't Hof
(1989). It describes that the subsidized technologies are in many cases end-of-pipe technolo-
gies that only shift the environmental problem to another level. In the example of waste water
treatment plants, unwanted substances are accumulated in the sludge. Instead of investing in
end-of-pipe technologies, more effort should be spent on solutions that try to avoid environ-
mental problems before they actually arise. This notion is also remarked by Anderson et al.
(1977). They said that if there were no subsidies to support the improvement of process re-
lated innovations, investment decisions of firms would tend to be in favor of wastewater
treatment facilities only.
However, it cannot be concluded that subsidies in water management should not be in-
troduced in general. It is only a warning that attention has to be paid to the negative side
effects that can come up if a subsidy scheme is not well planned and difficult to control.
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4.5.7 Taxes
As already stated in section 3.3, taxes have to be levied for equalization of social and private
marginal costs in order to internalize external effects that arise from water use. The optimal
tax level can be added to figure 3.3, which is depicted in figure 4.2.
Monetary unit
Social marginal
B cost curve
DE Private marginal
P* cost curve
t C
G
F
A
QS QP quantity of water
Figure 4.2 Social and private marginal costs and the optimal tax level
At the existing price P*, the distance t is the optimal tax level because this amount has
to be added to private marginal costs to incorporate social marginal costs. The tax revenue
that is received by the government is equivalent to the shaded rectangle D-E-F-G. Originally,
the costs that had to be borne by society were shown by the triangle A-B-C. After the intro-
duction of the tax these costs are internalized. The remaining area E-B-C-F can be divided
into two parts: one is the triangle E-C-F that describes part of the forgone benefit to the pri-
vate producer and the other is the striped triangle B-C-E that expresses social welfare gain.
The theoretical framework of the optimal tax level is clear but some difficulties emerge
if a proper tax level has to be determined in reality. In most cases it is hard to attach an objec-
tive monetary value to the damage arising from the excessive use of a natural resource. The
perpetrators of the exernalities usually evaluate the damage less severe than other interest
groups. Whether the imposition of a certain tax is accepted by the society, depends heavily on
the group that managed to have the most influence.
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4.6 Nonmarket-based incentives
4.6.1 Restrictions
A common situation in which restrictions are imposed is at times of unusual dry periods such
as droughts or seasonal water shortages. The restrictions may consist of prohibiting irrigation,
municipal outdoor uses (lawn sprinkling or car washing) or of industrial production con-
straints. A major disadvantage of this instrument is its dependence on monitoring and
execution, which may turn out to be too expensive. In cases where the administration is sub-
ject to corruption and bribery performed by bulk users even more pressure is put on small-
scale users. A restriction scheme can only be successful if it is fair to all groups of the society
and the need of it is clear to all consumers.
4.6.2 Quotas and licenses
Quotas and licenses are based on quantity control. They are divided among different users
with the intention to allocate a restricted amount of supply in a most efficient and equitable
way (Winpenny, 1994). Penalties have to be introduced for those users who exceed their as-
signed quota. This, in turn, means that it is dependent on monitoring and control.
There are different ways to determine the distribution of quota among the different us-
ers. Rosegrant (1997) mentions two possibilities: firstly the assignment of the quota in
proportion to the water that was extracted by each users in a certain base period and secondly,
in the case of groundwater extraction in agriculture, the appropriation on the base of the land
that is owned above an aquifer.
According to Arlosoroff who is cited by Winpenny (1994), quotation and licensing at-
tained great success in the Israeli industrial sector. Within 20 years, between 1962 and 1982,
the average water consumption (per unit value of output) was reduced with 70%. In that case,
the quotas are delivered according to the norms of the best-practice technology in combina-
tion with the specific circumstances of each firm.
4.6.3 Education and persuasion
It is doubtful whether the instrument of education and persuasion has influence on consumer
behaviour if it is introduced on its own. Winpenny (1994) notes that it could be used as an an-
nouncement for a price increase to 'soften up' consumers. Martin and Kulakowski (1991)
concluded on the base of an empirical research on urban water use in Tucson, Arizona, that
without an increase in price at the same time, information and education do not seem to have
a significant effect on water consumption.
Nieswiadomy (1992) found a positive effect of education programs, conservation and
education on urban water demand in the United States. His calculations show that only in the
West, public education has a significant effect on the reduction of water consumption but not
in other parts of the country. As a possible explanation of this phenomenon he mentions the
already existing awareness of water scarcity in the West which makes education programs
more effective.
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4.7 Direct interventions
Measures of direct intervention can have a supporting and reinforcing effect in combination
with the other economic instruments discussed above. In the case of direct interventions the
government plays an active role in the development and execution of the programs, whereas
in the case of market and non-market based instruments its main duty is to build a suitable
framework in which the individual users behave in their own best interest (Winpenny, 1994).
For instance, conservation programs, water efficient user application and industrial recycling
projects are useful if they are introduced together with price increases because it makes users
more aware of the possibilities of saving water.
Important direct intervention measure are leak detection and repair programs. The costs
of these measures are rather high and an involvement of the government is hence necessary.
Especially in developing countries technical losses due to leaks and deteriorated infrastructure
can be quite substantial, such that the costs of the programs are lower than the value of the
water saved and lower than the costs of the creation of new supplies (Winpenny, 1994).
Another typical situation for a direct involvement of the government is in cases of
emergency such as droughts or floods. These measures are mainly short-term interventions
and will stop when the state of emergency is over.
4.8 Conclusions
Chapter 4 presented several economic instruments that are supposed to stimulate a more
conscious use of water. It is striking that most of the examples of economic instruments
found in international literature stems from arid regions where absolute water scarcity is
evident and where water is the limiting factor. Knowing Dutch weather conditions and
Dutch history that is characterized by fighting against water for land reclamation it be-
comes obvious that absolute water scarcity is not the actual problem in the Netherlands.
The effort that is put in getting rid of water proves that water in general is abundant in the
Netherlands. The basic problem lies in the minor quality of surface water, which implies
high costs for its treatment and purification. Minor quality of surface water entails that
good quality groundwater is used for low-value applications such as the irrigation of
grassland. This indicates that the quality and quantity of water is closely related to each
other, which means that research on the quantity of water should necessarily take quality
issues into account as well.
The following chapter will discuss the applicability of economic instruments to the
Dutch situation with special attention to desiccation.
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5. The applicability of economic instruments to Dutch water
management
5.1 Introduction
This chapter gives a first attempt of testing economic instruments for the application to Dutch
water management with special attention to the desiccation problem. The main focus is put on
the instruments that belong to the market-based incentives as it is categorized in the previous
chapter. Five instruments have been selected from market-based incentives, namely prices,
tradable rights, effluent charges, subsidies and taxes. One instrument has been selected from
non-market based incentives, namely restrictions and quotas. The selected instruments have
been tested with respect to the following criteria: Effectiveness, equity, acceptability, financial
impact, controllability, interregional applicability, behavioral changes and environmental
impact. The interpretation of these criteria is given in section 5.2.
The desiccation problem is an important reason why the water issue has become a
hot topic in scientific as well as in administrative circles and a lot of effort is put into re-
search about the clarification of all connections and interrelationships within the complex
system of ground and surface water. Knowledge of the actual reasons for desiccation is
imperative for the effective application of economic instruments. Since these reasons are
rather diverse and can differ locally as mentioned in chapter two, there cannot be one over-
all solution to the problem. The economic instruments as they are found in international
literature focus mainly on the extraction and use of water. However, a reduction in extrac-
tion and use of water is only on some specific places an adequate contribution to a
reduction of desiccation and hence not the main strategy for mitigating the problem. This
does not mean that no attention should be paid to the extraction and use of water in the
Netherlands. As mentioned above high-quality water is not at all abundant in the Nether-
lands. Within the framework of the sustainable economy target of the Dutch government,
water savings and a more conscious use of water are binding.
Since 60% of the desiccation problem is caused by the 'improvement' of the drainage
system, the question arises if the selected economic instruments are also appropriate for
managing the hydrological system. Managing the hydrological system means influencing
the groundwater table by rearranging the surface water system such as reducing drainage
capacity, building controllable barrages or reducing the depths of ditches. Section 5.4 pres-
ents the test of the selected instruments on hydrological measures. Finally, section 5.4
gives some concluding remarks.
The testing has a rather general character. The impact on the tested criteria depends
on many conditions and circumstances, which certainly need further investigation. This
could not be carried out due to the time constraint of this project. The test results indicated
in the tables are hence open to debate.
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5.2 Interpretation of criteria
The tests have been carried out with the aid of (+, -)-tables with five different categories. '+
+' stands for a definite positive impact on the respective criteria, '+' stands for positive im-
pact, '- -' stands for a definite negative impact and '-' stands for a negative impact, '+/-'
indicates the possibility of positive as well as negative impact. '+(-)' [-(+)] means a mainly
positive [negative] impact with negative [positive] exceptions.
Effectiveness
This criterion indicates to what extent the introduced instrument can reach its objective or the
response of the affected parties to the introduced instrument. '+' notes that the instrument defi-
nitely reaches its objective and '-' notes that the instrument is less effective.
Equity
This criterion shows if the (financial) impact of the introduced instrument on the affected par-
ties is balancing. '+' means that the instrument is fair towards all effected parties, whereas '-'
means that the instruments is advantageous for some special parties and disadvantageous for
the other parties.
Acceptability
This criterion shows if users accept the implemented instrument. '+' notes that they accept it
and '-' notes that they do not accept it.
Financial impact
This criterion is subdivided into users, water company and administration for the test on
extraction. Financial impact means the costs (-) and incomes (+) that occur to these differ-
ent parties by implementing the instrument.
Controllability
This criterion indicates the effort that the supervising agency has to put into controlling the re-
spective instrument and the actions of the users. Controllability includes also sensitivity to
fraud. '+ ' means that the instrument is easy to control and hence not sensitive to fraud. '-'
means that controlling the instruments is more complicated and committing fraud becomes
easier.
Interregional applicability
This criterion signifies if it is possible and useful to implement an instrument nationwide. '+'
means that it is applicable nationwide and '-' means the opposite.
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Behavioral changes
This criterion indicates if the respective instruments induce changes in the use patterns of the
water user (e.g. reducing the time for showering from 10 to 5 minutes). '+' notes changes and
'-' notes no changes in behavior.
Environmental impact
Obviously, this criterion focuses mainly on the instruments' impact on the reduction of desic-
cation. '+' notes a significant contribution and '-' notes no significant contribution to a
reduction of desiccation.
5.3 Application of instruments to extraction
The parties that are taken into account for water use are households and agriculture. Agricul-
ture can directly extract groundwater, whereas households can only buy water from the water
company. Since the water use pattern of these parties are rather different, they are tested sepa-
rately. The (+, -)-tables are placed as a summary at the end of the section. It has to be
mentioned that the industrial sector also extracts large amounts of groundwater, which is on
some specific places a major cause of the desiccation problem. Due to time constraints, in-
dustries had to be left out.
5.3.1 Prices
At present, prices for drinking water vary widely from region to region in the Netherlands.
The differences in prices are caused by the of use surface water as a source for drinking
water in some regions. The use of surface water entails higher costs for both transport and
treatment. Consumers in different parts of the country have therefore different expenses for
water services. In the frame of anti-desiccation projects the objectives of Dutch water sup-
ply companies is to use more surface water instead of groundwater all over the country.
This implies that the water prices in the regions with groundwater as main supply for
drinking water will rise and hence may approach the same level as the water prices in re-
gions where surface water is used already. The prices for drinking water from groundwater
do not include the external costs that arise through desiccation. If these costs would be in-
ternalized into the existing costs of supply, the price for drinking water from groundwater
would rise as well.
Households
The effectiveness of the price instrument depends on the price elasticity of water demand be-
cause it shows consumers' response to price increases. The price elasticity of water use in
Dutch households has been estimated by Kooreman (1993) and Linderhof (1997). Kooreman
found a value of -0.10 with a significance level of 90% at a water price of 116 ct/m3. Linder-
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hof's result is a price elasticity of -0.7 with a significance level of 95%. Although these esti-
mations are rather low, they could have a substantial effect in physical terms. Linderhof gives
an example. He illustrates that a 10% price increase of the average water price of 135 ct/m3
would (with the average water consumption of 130m3 per capita per year) result in a reduction
of water use of 0.91m3 per capita per year. According to the studies by Kooreman and Lin-
derhof, there are some indications that the price instrument could have a positive influence on
the reduction of water use in households.
The price instrument requires metering. According to the VEWIN (information sup-
plied by telephone) the metering percentage in the Netherlands will reach 100% in the next
few years.1 Interregional applicability is hence guaranteed.
A price reform that encloses an increase in prices due to the substitution of ground-
water by surface water and due to the internalization of external effects gets a high score
concerning equity. Firstly, with respect to the equalization of the price differences, sec-
ondly, with respect to nature, that presently has to suffer losses due to groundwater
extraction activities and thirdly, as a result from the previous point, with respect to society
that has to bear less costs for anti-desiccation activities. Furthermore, a metered system
makes sure that everyone only has to pay the amount of water that he actually consumed.
A fair instrument will also be widely accepted. Exceptions may be found in areas where
users have to pay their water use according to the number of taps. A payment according to
liters used would entail a significant increase of the water bill.
The financial impact on users is negative. (Water saving activities that might be carried
out as a reaction to higher prices might have a compensating effect. This implies that the wa-
ter bill might reduce again to its original level or even to a lower one.) Water companies have
a positive financial impact because of increased incomes.
Provided that the water meters are sealed such that it is not possible for the users to ma-
nipulate the counter, the price instrument is not sensitive to fraud and easy to control.
Behavioral changes means in what way consumers consciously change their use pat-
terns. If it is noticeable on the water bill that fair amounts of water can be saved with the help
of water saving technologies only, behavioral changes might not be significant. People that
cannot afford water saving technologies have to change their behavior towards water use if
they want to see a positive effect on their water bill.
The extraction of groundwater for domestic drinking water use causes only 10% of the
desiccation problem. A reduction in domestic water consumption has therefore only a minor
effect on the reduction of desiccation and hence a minor environmental impact.
A positive side effect of a reduction in domestic water consumption is a reduction in
energy use. Energy is saved because half of the water that has been saved would have been
heated and also does not need to be transported by the water company.
                                                
1 Big cities that have to been metered in the past years are Groningen, Rotterdam and Amsterdam. The city of
Groningen just finished the installation of water meters in all households. In Rotterdam, the installation is in
progress and in Amsterdam it is just starting.
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Agriculture
The testing for agriculture is based on the current situation, which means that farmers are
still allowed to build their own wells.
Up to now, in the agricultural sector a pricing reform had an adverse effect. A raise of
the water price entails that farmers build their own wells instead of buying water from the
water company. Van Staalduinen et al. (1996) report advantageous points for farmers to build
their own well. Firstly, the costs that are occurring to the farmer include only the investment
costs of the well and a groundwater tax of 0.17 guilders per m3 (water companies have to pay
a groundwater tax that is twice as much, namely 0.34 guilders per m3). Secondly, private per-
sons only have to register if the extraction capacity of the well exceeds 10m3 per hour.
Thirdly, farmers are released from groundwater taxes for the first 40,000m3 groundwater per
year that are used for irrigation. Fourthly, a nil-tariff has to be paid if the extracted ground-
water infiltrates back to its original water system.
Water consumption might increase because the investment in the well needs to be
earned back. Effectiveness is therefore not guaranteed in this case and the environmental im-
pact is negative as well. If farmers can avoid paying higher prices for water, they do not have
any incentives to change their behavior towards water use.
A higher price for water is not accepted among farmers. Otherwise the increasing
amount of private wells cannot be explained.
The financial impact for farmers is positive because the extraction from a private well is
cheaper than buying water from the water company. The financial impact for the water com-
panies is hence negative, firstly, because of reduced revenues and secondly because of the
occurrence of costs due to overcapacity.1 Costs are also occurring to the administration be-
cause of increasing requests for private wells.
For a successful implementation of the price instrument in agriculture, legislation con-
cerning the building of private wells has to be changed beforehand. If it stays possible for
farmers to avoid paying higher prices for water, they do not have any incentive to think about
saving activities.
5.3.2 Tradable rights
The tradable rights that are meant here, are tradable rights for groundwater extraction.
Since households do not extract themselves it is not applicable in this case.
Agriculture
The following situation is assumed:
− the farmers are situated in the same area, in which their extraction activities have a
negative impact on the nearby natural area. (Hence, no interregional applicability);
− trade can take place between farmers;
                                                
1  Due to the increasing amount of private wells from farmers, the annual sales of water companies in the
province Limburg have decreased with 8% in recent years (Intermediar, 29-09-1997).
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− trade can also take place between the administration and farmers. The administration in
this case represents interests for nature conservation. In the frame of an anti-desiccation
program the administration can buy groundwater extraction rights in order to keep
farmers from extraction;
− the price the administration pays to the farmers is high enough to compensate farmers
for possible damage to crops due to lack of irrigation.
The mobility of the water market depends much on the farmers' attitude towards risk.
Farmers are not likely to sell their water rights to other farmers if they do not want to run the
risk of too much damage to their crops in cases of droughts. If the administration decides to
buy groundwater extraction rights, it can be effective for a reduction of desiccation. The
problem of how much the farmers will receive as compensation (the price for the water rights)
can be big. Costs for administration are quite high in any case. Firstly, because they have to
buy rights if groundwater extraction by farmers has to be reduced. Secondly, because the in-
troduction of water rights requires a lot administrational work, which includes also that all
farmers have to be controlled if they actually extract the amount that they are entitled to by
their rights only (negative score on controllability).
This measure can be summarized as being effective with a positive environmental input
at high costs for administration.
5.3.3 Effluent charges
Households
Effluent charges have an indirect effect on water use. In order to make consumers conscious
of the connection between use of drinking water and effluent charges, the Dutch water sector
is discussing the introduction of the so-called 'Waterspoor'. 'Waterspoor' implies that the sew-
age charges are paid as a percentage of drinking water use. In this way users have more
influence on sewage charges and water bill. A reduction in water use has therefore a double
saving effect, which probably makes this instrument especially efficient. A variation of 'Wa-
terspoor' is the broad 'Waterspoor', which includes also purification taxes in the charging
system. Estimations hint that 20% of present drinking water consumption could be saved by
introducing the broad 'Waterspoor' (Kiewiet and Van Dam, 1998). The broad 'Waterspoor' is
in fact a policy mix of pricing reforms, sewage charges and taxes. It is a promising move to-
wards users' involvement into the working of the water chain and their alerting about the
increasing scarcity of good quality fresh water. This could entail behavioral changes. 'Water-
spoor' is a rather new item in the water sector and acceptability and income effects on users
has not been tested yet. If policy makers succeed in giving clear and understandable informa-
tion about the tariff structure in 'Waterspoor' to all users, acceptability can be high because
users realize saving potentials in their water consumption.
The other criteria are comparable to the price instrument.
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Agriculture
Effluent charges for farmers are not likely to have the same effect as for consumers: only a
small part of the water used by farmers is discharged as effluent into the sewage system.
Therefore this measure has limited applicability.
5.3.4 Subsidies
Households
It is assumed that subsidies for households are realized by low prices for water saving
technologies, such as water saving shower heads, toilet flushing systems, washing ma-
chines etc. It has to be mentioned that subsidies are closely related to the price of water. It
will partly depend on the time of amortization if consumers make use of subsidies or not.
Subsidies get a very high score with respect to the following criteria: Effectiveness, be-
cause water can be saved without even changing behavior, equity, because everyone has the
right to make use of them, acceptability, because consumers are supported, controllability,
because if the subsidy is put on the price of the water saving technologies, they cannot be
abused, interregional applicability, because water saving technologies can be bought all over
the country. The financial impact on users is neutral: some investment by the users is still
necessary, which is often earned back over an extended period of time. Subsidies are negative
for the government (administration) because it provides the price support for water saving
technologies.
Behavioral changes might occur because consumers become more aware of the water
problem. On the other hand, possibly no bevavioral change will occur, because buying subsi-
dized water saving technologies may be considered as sufficient personal contribution.
As already mentioned above, the contribution of households to the desiccation problem
is only 10%. Water saving in this category therefore has a minor positive environmental im-
pact.
Agriculture
It is assumed that subsidies are given for the introduction of water saving technologies. The
saving effect resulting from this measure might only consist of the water saved by the new
technology because farmers tend to irrigate more than is actually needed in order to be on the
safe side, which means that they will not change their behavior because of subsidized water
saving technologies. Another reason for the mediocre effectiveness of subsidies is the fact that
farmers still have to invest some of their own money. This money has to be earned back as
soon as possible (financial impact negative in the beginning, later positive because of savings
of irrigation water). With the believe of more irrigation resulting in higher yields even more
irrigation water will be used in order to obtain higher revenues. If the subsidies are connected
to the price of water saving technologies, they are relatively easy to control.
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5.3.5 Taxes
Households
It is assumed that taxes are put on the consumption of water and not on the extraction. The
impact of taxes on the different criteria is comparable to the price instrument. An exception
is the financial impact on water companies and administrations (government). Taxes are a
source of income for the government, Hence, financial impact for the government is posi-
tive and neutral for water companies.
Agriculture
Higher taxes that are put directly on extraction of groundwater (for example, the same tax
rate as other extractors have to pay) have a negative financial impact on farmers. This
could induce saving activities (behavioral changes) by farmers, which in turn has positive
environmental effects. The building of private wells is still rather attractive because farm-
ers only have to pay the tax to the administration (positive financial impact) and not the
price for water to the water company (negative financial impact). Controllability remains
difficult.
5.3.6 Restrictions and quotas
Households
Restrictions or quota for households would only be acceptable in situations of emergency,
as, for instance, in a very dry summer. In such a situation low value applications such as
lawn sprinkling or car washing could be prohibited.
Agriculture
Restrictions and quota are forcing instruments and it is assumed that the penalty that has to be
paid if the restricted amount of groundwater extraction is exceeded, is rather high. This would
make this instrument effective with a positive environmental effect. The instrument scores
negative in acceptability, controllability and, in cases of violation of the restricted amounts, in
financial impact on users. This, in turn, implies positive financial impact on the administra-
tion.
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Table 5.1a The impact of selected economic instruments aimed at the use/extraction of water on different Crite-
ria for households
Households

price tradable effluent charges/ subsidies taxes restric-
reforms rights a) 'waterspoor' tions b)

Effectiveness + n.a. ++ ++ + l.a.
Equity ++ n.a. ++ ++ ++ l.a.
Acceptability +(-) n.a. + ++ +(-) l.a.
Financial Impact
User - n.a. - +(-) - l.a.
Water Company + n.a. + +(-) +(-) l.a.
Administration +/- n.a. +(-) - ++ l.a.
Controllability ++ n.a. ++ ++ ++ l.a.
Interregional
Applicability ++ n.a. ++ ++ ++ l.a.
Behavioral Changes +/- n.a. + +(-) +(-) l.a.
Environmental Impact + n.a. + + + l.a.
a) n.a.: not applicable.
b) l.a.: limited applicability.
Table 5.1b The impact of selected economic instruments aimed at the use/extraction of water on different
criteria for agriculture
Agriculture

price tradable effluent subsidies taxes restrictions
reforms rights charges a) and quota's
Effectiveness -- + l.a. + + ++
Equity - + l.a. + ++ +/-
Acceptability -- - l.a. + - -
Financial Impact
User + +/- l.a. -/+ - - (+/-)
Water Company -- +/- l.a. +/- - +/-
Administration - -- l.a. - + +
Controllability - -- l.a. + - -
Interregional
Applicability + - l.a. ++ ++ +
Behavioral
Changes -- +/- l.a. - + +/-
Environmental
Impact -- + l.a. + + +
l.a.= limited applicability.
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5.4 Application of instruments to hydrological measures
Hydrological measures as they are defined here are rearrangements of the surface water sys-
tem that influence the groundwater level. The main hydrological measures are the reduction
of drainage capacity on agricultural land, the building of controllable barrages and the reduc-
tion of the depths of ditches. The main objective of the implementation of economic instru-
ments is the reduction of desiccation. Mitigating desiccation depends heavily on the under-
standing of the impact of the hydrological system on the vegetation at a local level (Jalink and
Meeuwissen, 1998). This implies that anti-desiccation strategies can and must differ locally.
For instance, the removal of the drainage system is the best measure on some places, whereas
on other places a reduction in the depth of ditches is the most successful strategy. Successful
anti-desiccation program needs hence a region specific approach.
The question is now if economic instruments are applicable to stimulate the introduc-
tion of the hydrological measures described above. Agriculture benefits from the current
situation of water drainage. The party that is mainly affected by a change of this situation is
hence agriculture, which implies that the instruments have to aim at farmers. Hydrological
measures need to be applied to the whole area under consideration in order to be effective.
This implies that the introduction of hydrological measures affects several farmers at the same
time. The instrument must therefore be applied to groups of farmers.
The problem is that the farmers have little advantage to gain from the introduction of
techniques to lower the drainage capacity: a certain minimum drainage capacity is needed to
make sure no water overload occurs. Subsidies for anti-drainage techniques would not work
in such a case.
Lowering the drainage capacity entails lower crop yields for farmers. By whichever
technique the lowering of the drainage capacity is introduced, the farmers will in any case
demand to be compensated for their financial losses. At the moment compensation payments
to farmers are the main strategy in the discussion around the reduction of desiccation. A pos-
sible situation would be where groups of farmers reach an agreement with the water boards
and the administration about the introduction of anti-drainage techniques. The administration
would need to bear the costs for these operations and somehow compensate the farmers in the
future for financial losses. In chapter 6 a model is presented with which the compensation
payments to farmers can be estimated.
However, the strategy of compensation payments is rather in favor of the agricultural
sector. Another strategy could be the introduction of taxes or charges that farmers have to pay
for a groundwater level that is optimal for agriculture. This is a rather theoretical approach
and more practical insight would be needed in order to evaluate them. A first move towards
such an idea is done also in the chapter 6. There, it is assumed that the optimal groundwater
table from a social point of view is in that point where marginal costs to agriculture due to
higher groundwater tables equal marginal benefits to nature. This specific groundwater table
could be reached with the help of economic instruments such as taxes or charges.
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5.5 Conclusions
The applicability of economic instruments to reduce desiccation is ambiguous. Several in-
struments have been found to be effective with respect to extraction activities. However,
extraction activities contribute with only 30% to the desiccation problem. This does not
mean that economic instruments should not be applied to extraction (and in fact some of
them are currently being applied in the Netherlands): it alerts people about the value of
water in general and stimulates creative water recycling technologies.
It has been mentioned several times in this report that hydrological measures are the
major remedy against desiccation and that they are the most effective in mitigating the prob-
lem. Effective solutions for the desiccation problem seem to be situated on the technical level.
Examples are the fine-tuning of water discharge or changes in land use. Fine-tuning of water
discharge means sufficient water discharge in springtime such that farmers are able to culti-
vate their land and conservation of water as soon as the cultivation is done. This might even
be advantageous for farmers because it might reduce drought damage in the summer, which
implies that irrigation costs could be saved.1 Changes in land use mean that areas that are es-
pecially sensitive to desiccation are destined to be natural conservation territory only and
agriculture is moved to areas of less ecological value that are destined to be agricultural area
only.
In the current discussion around the desiccation problem, compensation payments to
farmers for agricultural losses due to higher groundwater tables seem to have the major atten-
tion. An alternative approach could be the introduction of taxes or charges paid by farmers if
they want to have a groundwater table that is optimal for agricultural production but below the
social optimum. A first attempt of the estimation of compensation payments and the determi-
nation of taxes or charges on an artificially low groundwater table is presented in the
following chapter.
                                                
1 A test farm in the province Noord-Brabant made good experiences with saving irrigation costs by conserving
water in the ditches. The water level in the ditches influences the groundwater level, which is controlled on a
weekly basis and is kept on 50 cm below the soil surface. This strategy saved the farm about 50 mm irrigation
water per hectare, which is 150 guilders per hectare per year in monetary terms (Agrarisch Dagblad, 8-01-1998).
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6. Desiccation and agriculture: how to find the optimal
groundwater table?
6.1 Introduction
The central point in this chapter is the competing interest concerning the groundwater level
between an agricultural and a natural area. The agricultural area benefits from a low
groundwater table and the natural area benefits from a high groundwater table. Two policy
measures are dealt with in this chapter: compensation payments to farmers for agricultural
losses due to higher groundwater tables and taxes and charges that farmers have to pay for
a groundwater table adjusted to agriculture.
The relationship between the groundwater level and agricultural crop yields is dis-
cussed in section 6.2. First of all, the paragraph 6.2.1 gives some theoretical background
about this issue. The subsequent paragraphs describe the estimation of five functions,
namely for five different crops, that describe crop yields with respect to groundwater table.
Paragraph 6.2.2 presents a description of the study area. The chosen study area is the East-
ern Cattle Area, which is situated in the eastern part in the Netherlands, where desiccation
plays an important role. Paragraph 6.2.3 explains the attainment and construction of the
data set that serves as the base for the estimations. The estimations are carried out by
means of regression analysis. The last paragraph in section 6.2 gives a first attempt of a
validation of the estimation results.
The results found in section 6.2 serve as input for the optimization model presented
in section 6.3 that is used to illustrate the competing interests between agriculture and na-
ture. First of all, paragraph 6.3.1 shows the optimal groundwater table for agriculture.
Next, in paragraph 6.3.2, a value-of-nature function is introduced in the analysis. The
value-of-nature is expressed as index and also as monetary value. With the help of the
model, losses to agriculture respectively to nature at different groundwater levels can be
calculated. The losses to agriculture can be used as an indication for the amount of com-
pensation payments for farmers.
Taxes and charges are applied in order to reach on optimal solution from society's
point of view. The optimal solution for the heights of the groundwater table is found by
equalizing marginal costs and benefits or by maximizing combined revenue of agricluture
and nature. Both methods result into the same outcomes. This is shown in section 6.3.3.
The optimal groundwater table is at that point where marginal costs for agriculture arising
through yield losses due to a higher groundwater table and marginal benefits for nature are
equal. Since the monetary value-of-nature is rather debatable, the last paragraph in section
6.3 presents a sensitivity analysis on the value-of nature function. This chapter finishes off
with section 6.4, which gives some concluding remarks.
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6.2 The influence of the groundwater table on crop yields
The relationship between groundwater level and crop yield is very complex. Feddes and Van
Wijk (1976) stated that this relationship is only indirect because crop yield is actually depend-
ent on soil moisture that is in turn determined by the groundwater level. Furthermore, the
influence of other factors, such as climate, precipitation, humidity, or fertilization, is certainly
substantial. However, for the purpose of this study it is suitable to abstract the problem to the
influence of the groundwater level only and to illuminate a few different aspects.
6.2.1 Physical and agrotechnical aspects
A depression in crop yield can occur if the groundwater table is either too high or too low. In
the first case, air conditions, nitrogen supply and soil temperature could be suboptimal,
whereas in the second case, water supply might not be sufficient to guarantee an optimal
growth of the plant.
While describing the influence of the groundwater table on crop yield, it is useful to di-
vide the vegetation period into three different stages. Feddes and Van Wijk (1976) present a
division into winter and spring conditions, growing season-, and autumn conditions for arable
and grassland.
a) Winter and spring conditions
This period is determined by the seed bed preparation and the start of the growing season.
A groundwater table that is too high has negative effects on the following aspects (Werk-
groep HELP, 1987).
Workability and cultivation of the soil
For the activities of arable farming in the springtime it is important that the soil guarantees
enough bearing strength for the heavy machines to carry out cultivation, fertilization, sowing
and planting. A crucial point in time is the sowing date because it determines the length of the
growing season. An influential source of yield losses is therefore a delay in the sowing date,
which entails that plant growth lags behind. Werkgroep HELP (1987) cites Wind who found
out that the magnitude of yield depression due to delayed sowing is about 0.5 to 1% per day.
Schothorst, who is cited by Feddes and Van Wijk (1976) has shown for grassland that
the soil has enough bearing strength if the groundwater table is not higher than 30 cm below
the soil surface.
Air conditions in root zone
High soil moisture can be the cause of an insufficient exchange between the atmosphere and
the air in the soil, which will lead to oxygen deficit in the root zone. As a consequence respi-
ration of the roots is decreasing such that the transportation of water and nutrients constrains,
which favors the formation of toxic elements. Inadequate ventilation of the soil due to a high
groundwater level in spring is therefore disadvantageous for the development of the root sys-
tem. This implies a restricted capability to absorb water and nutrients also in the remaining
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vegetation period. In extreme cases of water overload the roots loose their ability to absorb
water totally and will consequently fade.
Another difficulty that arises from insufficient ventilation is the inhibition of nitrogen
mineralization and nitrification. In extremely wet circumstances even denitrification can take
place, which means a loss of nitrogen. An additional application of nitrogen can partly com-
pensate yield depressions due to high groundwater levels (Feddes and Van Wijk, 1976).
Soil temperature
Soil temperature has a strong influence on germination and hence on the beginning of the
growing phase. According to Feddes who is cited by the Workgroep HELP (1987), the seed
bed temperature at a high groundwater level is 1 to 2°C lower than at a deep groundwater
level.
b) Growing season
During the growing season, the production of crop yield is directly determined by the magni-
tude of evapotranspiration (Feddes and Van Wijk, 1976). If the plant cannot evapotranspirate
sufficiently due to lack of water there will be depression in yields. The depression in yields is
actually a result of a decrease of the assimilation of CO2. This is because evapotranspiration
of water and assimilation of CO2 are taking the same way out of respectively into the plant,
namely through the stomas. If water supply is insufficient the plant will close its stomas in or-
der to save water but at the same time CO2 uptake is hindered. This leads to a decrease of
photosynthetic activities and hence the growth of the plant is stopped (Wesseling, 1976).
c) Autumn conditions
The effects of a high water table under arable land in autumn are similar to that in spring
time. Whereas in springtime it is advantageous to sow as early as possible, in autumn it is
favorable to put off harvesting to a later date because it extends the length of the growing
season. For a late harvest date it is necessary that the groundwater table is low enough such
that the soil has sufficient bearing strength for heavy machines.
Next to these physical aspects, there are also issues with respect to farm management
that determine the seriousness of water overload (Werkgroep HELP, 1987). Firstly, intensive
and highly mechanized farm practices experience water overload more serious and therefore
put higher demands on drainage. Secondly, the risk of water overload is more apparent at
crops that need a long growing season, which implies that they have to be sown/planted early
in spring and harvested late in autumn. Thirdly, in the case of grassland, damage due to water
overload can be mitigated by organizational arrangements with respect to the grazing system.
Epecially in areas with sandy soil where most farms have low as well as high fields at their
disposal, it is possible to avoid the low fields in wet periods and use the higher fields instead.
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6.2.2 Data
a) Description of the study area: the Eastern Cattle Area
The agricultural district 'Eastern Cattle Area' (from now on ECA) includes major parts of the
provinces Gelderland and Overijssel and a small piece of the southern part of the province
Drenthe. The ECA is depicted in figure 6.1.
As indicated in the name, the main agricultural activities in the ECA are dairy farming
and cattle breeding. Therefore, the major part of the area is grassland. Table 6.1 on the fol-
lowing page shows the use of agricultural land in the ECA in 1993.
The crops that are taken into account for the quantitative analysis are grassland, maize,
potatoes, sugar beets, and grain. Since the remaining crops that are shown in table 6.1 have
only marginal contributions to land use, they are neglected in the analysis.
Physical yields and prices for grass, maize, potatoes, sugar beets, and grain for the ECA
are shown in table 6.2 on the following page. The data are from the year 1992.
Figure 6.1 The Eastern Cattle Area
Source: LEI.
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Table 6.1 Agricultural land use in the Eastern Cattle Area, 1993

Agricultural land use in 1993 in 1,000 hectare in %

Grassland 200.1 65.8
Tillage 99.7 32.8
maize 72.4 23.8
potatoes 13.8 4.6
sugar beets 6.2 2.0
grain 5.5 1.8
others 1.8 0.6
Horticulture 3.2 1.1
open field 3.1 1.1
greenhouses 0.1 0.0
Fallow 0.8 0.3
Total 303.8 100

Source: Hoogeveen et al, 1996.
Table 6.2 Physical yields and prices of grass, maize, potatoes, sugar beets, and grain for the ECA in 1992

Grass Maize Potatoes Sugar beets Grain
(kVEM) (kVEM) (kg) (kg) (kg)

Physical yield per hectare9,260 11,830 46,000 60,900 4,590
Price in guilders per kVEM resp. kg 0.31 0.31 0.115 0.099 0.46

Source: Hoogeveen et al., 1996.
(kVEM = kilo voeder eenheid melk (kilo gram feed unit milk)).
The information noted in table 6.2 is the basis for the construction of the data set, which
is described in the following paragraph.
b) Construction and attainment of data
Depression tables
Werkgroep HELP (1987) published different tables in which percentage yield depressions
due to water overload respectively drought, are noted. The depression tables are partly based
on hydrological computer simulations and partly on practical experience from field tests.
They are based on the principle of groundwater steps, which is a way of categorizing the
situation of groundwater tables in the Dutch subsoil area. Every groundwater step has its spe-
cific 'averaged highest groundwater level (AHG)' and 'averaged lowest groundwater level
(ALG)'. Table 6.3 shows these values for the different groundwater steps.
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Table 6.3 Groundwater steps with corresponding AHG and ALG

Groundwater step I II III IV V VI VII

AHG in cm below soil surface 5 10 15 50 25 60 100
ALG in cm below soil surface 30 70 105 110 140 170 200

Source: Beugelink and Claessen, 1995.
Table 6.3 clarifies that a groundwater step with a low respectively high value represents
wet respectively dry soil conditions.
The depression tables are sorted by different types of soil. For every type of soil there is
one table for grassland and one table for arable land. Since the ECA is mainly determined by
sandy podzol soil (SC-DLO, 1997), the tables for this type of soil have to be the choice. The
percentage depression values for yields on grassland and arable land that are taken from the
depression tables by Werkgroep HELP are listed in table A (grassland) and table B (arable
land) in appendix B.
The table for arable land gives average percentage values. To get the drought depres-
sion value for the different arable crops the average yield depression percentage value shown
in the table has to be modified according to crop specific formulas. The percentage values for
maize are taken as a reference and do not have to be modified. Table 6.4 shows the different
formulas as they are noted in Werkgroep HELP (1987).
Table 6.4 Percentage yield depressions on arable land through lack of water per crop on sandy podzol soil

CROP Percentage yield depressions through lack of water per crop (y) as a function
of average depression percentage value (x) as noted in table B in appendix B

Maize y  = x
Potatoes y  = 1.15 x + 0.5
Sugar beets y  = 0.85 x - 0.5
Grain y  = 1.05 x - 2.5

Source: Werkgroep HELP, 1987.
According to Van Wijk et al. (1988) and Feddes and Van Wijk (1976) it is assumed that
the optimal groundwater level for grassland is at 60 cm below the soil surface and for arable
crops at 100 cm below the soil surface. This is also indicated in table A and B in appendix B,
where zero percent depression is noted at 60 cm below soil surface (table A for grassland) re-
spectively at 100 cm below soil surface (table B for arable land). Because the present situation
of water control is entirely attuned to agriculture (Ministerie van verkeer en waterstaat, 1996),
it is assumed that the actual values of crop yield from 1992 (table 6.2) are optimal. This as-
sumption implies that the yield of grass (9260 kVEM/ha) is harvested at a groundwater table
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of 60 cm below the soil surface whereas the yields of the arable crops (e.g. for maize: 11,830
kVEM/ha) are harvested at a groundwater table of 100 cm below the soil surface.
With the help of the percentage depression values from table A and B in appendix B
and the physical yields that are shown in table 6.2 the percentage depressions due to water
overload and drought for all different crops can be calculated. The depression values for
drought damage on arable land are calculated according to the formulas in table 6.4. In order
to obtain a continuous data set, the depression values that cannot be attained by means of the
depression table, are calculated by linear interpolation. The constructed data set is presented
in appendix C.
6.2.3 Regression Analysis
The function that describes the relationship between the groundwater table and crop yield is
supposed to have a parabolic form. This is sensible because as mentioned above there is yield
depression if the groundwater table is either too high or too low with the optimum somewhere
in-between.
The functional forms that reflect a parabolic shape are quadratic and cubic functions.
The quadratic function takes the form:
Yx = α + β1*GW + β2*GW2 + ε (6.1)
The cubic function takes the form:
Yx = α + β1*GW + β2*GW2 + β3*GW3 + ε (6.2)
Where: Yx = Yield of crop x;
GW = Groundwater table;
α = Constant;
βx = Parameters;
ε = Error term.
With the help of the computer program SPSS, five estimations have been carried out,
namely for the five different crops mentioned above. After running the estimation procedures
for the quadratic and cubic form it becomes evident that the cubic form gives the best fit. This
is demonstrated in figure 6.2 for the example of grassland.
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Figure 6.2 Curve estimations of quadratic and cubic functional form for the yield of grassland with respect to
groundwater table
Figure 6.2 shows that the cubic form (black line) describes the observed data set (dotted
line) better than the quadratic from (dashed line). The fact that the cubic form is moving up-
wards again at a groundwater table of 240 cm below soil surface is of no importance in this
case because the range under consideration is situated below this value. The estimations for
the other crops show similar results namely that the cubic function is preferred to the quad-
ratic one. The figures of the curve estimations for the other crops are depicted in appendix D.
Table 6.5 Estimation results for the cubic function crop yield with respect to groundwater table

Crop Constant β1 β2 β3 R2

Grassland 7,172.987 59.795 -0.51 0.001 0.97
(70.62) (18.93) (-19.06) (16.5)
Maize 7,487.919 112.811 -0.9 0.002 0.97
(64.37) (31.19) (-29.33) (25.18)
Potatoes 28,822.508 456.818 -3.733 0.008 0.98
(62.65) (31.93) (-30.78) (26.58)
Sugar Beets 38,936.056 556.699 -4.319 0.009 0.97
(65.07) (29.92) (-27.38) (23.33)
Grain 2,884.929 44.129 -0.344 0.0007 0.98
(75.36) (37.07) (-34.06) (28.77)

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The estimation results of the cubic functions for the five different crops are shown in
table 6.5. The t-values are noted in brackets.
With the estimated functions for the five different crops the specific groundwater tables
that result in the maximum yields of the different crops can be calculated. The maximum
yields per hectare with the related groundwater tables are listed in table 6.6.
Table 6.6 Different crops and the optimal groundwater table with related maximum yield per hectare (based
on estimation results)

Crop Optimal groundwater table Maximum yield
(cm below soil surface) per hectare

Grassland 75.3 9,210.76 kVEM
Maize 89.19 11,809.15 kVEM
Potatoes 83.72 45,596.94 kg
Sugar Beets 89.47 60,616.61 kg
Grain 87.52 4,581.41 kg

Appendix E shows a figure of the production values of the five different crops (physical
yields multiplied by the respective prices) with respect to the groundwater table. The figure
depicts that sugar beets produce at all groundwater levels the highest revenue. The order of
the five crops starting with the one producing the highest revenue is sugar beets, potatoes,
maize, grass, grain. This order remains the same at every groundwater level. This is an indi-
cation that at current prices for the different crops the cropping pattern does not change if the
groundwater table changes. These findings are used in the following simplified model (sec-
tion 6.3) as an assumption that land use does not change if the groundwater table increases.
6.2.4 Validation of results
Since the estimation results are based on a constructed data set, a validation of these results by
means of empirical data is needed. Due to problems with respect to data availability and the
time constraint of this research, a quantitative validation cannot be carried out. A rough indi-
cation about the verity of the estimation results is found in Brouwer et al. (1996). They give
empirical data for the yield of grassland in kVEM per hectare with respect to four groundwa-
ter groups for the years 1992/1993 and 1993/1994. The categorization into groundwater
groups is a simplification of the groundwater steps that are displayed in table 6.3. The
groundwater steps with the corresponding groundwater groups and the referring average
spring groundwater table are noted in table 6.7.
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Table 6.7 Groundwater steps with corresponding groundwater group and average spring groundwater table

Groundwater step Groundwater group Average spring groundwater
table (cm below soil surface)

I A 15
II A 27
III B 40
IV C 65
V B 52
VI / VII D >90

Source: adapted from Brouwer et al. (1996) and Beugelink and Claessen (1995).
The four data points of grass yield with the respective groundwater group that are given
in Brouwer et al. are shown in figure 6.3.
Figure 6.3 Grass yield with respect to groundwater category
Source: The data are taken from Brouwer et at., 1996.
Figure 6.3 indicates that the highest grass yield is obtained in groundwater category C
and yield depressions for the categories A, B and D. Table 6.7 shows that category C corre-
sponds with an average spring groundwater table of 65 cm below soil surface. The maximum
grass yield in the constructed data set is assumed to be obtained at a groundwater table of 60
cm. The fact that the constructed data set is based on depression tables, which in turn are the
result partly of hydrological computer simulations and partly of experiences from field tests
explains the differences between empirical data and the estimation results from the analysis in
this research. Furthermore, the aggregation into four groundwater categories implies losses in
exactness. However, a parabolic shape of the function can be recognized in the empirical data
for grass yield with respect to groundwater categories.
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Empirical data for arable crops with respect to the groundwater table are not taken into
consideration.
6.3 A simplified model
This section presents the model that describes the competing interest concerning the ground-
water table between an agricultural area and a natural area. The areas have the same size and
are situated next to each other such that the groundwater tables under both areas are at the
same levels.
First of all, a method of calculating compensation payments to farmers for agricultural
losses due to higher groundwater tables is proposed. Another approach explains how taxes or
charges could theoretically contribute to reach a groundwater table that is optimal from a so-
cial point of view. This can be done by equalizing marginal costs to agriculture and marginal
benefits for nature or by maximizing both revenues, that of agriculture and that of nature,
jointly. Both methods will lead to the same results.
The following assumptions have been made in this simplified model:
− agricultural land use: 60% grassland, 25% maize, 5% potatoes, 5% sugar beets and 5%
grain. These dimensions of agricultural land use are a rough indication of the agricultural
land use in the ECA shown in table 6.1;
− agricultural land use does not change if the groundwater table increases (see above appen-
dix E);
− the agricultural area and the natural area are both of the same size and are situated next to
each other;
− the groundwater table has to be the same under both areas.
6.3.1 The optimal groundwater level for agriculture
The optimal groundwater level for agriculture is found by maximizing total revenue, which is
the sum of the revenues of the five different crops.
TOTREV = REVG + REVM + REVP + REVS + REVGN (6.3)
Where: TOTREV = Total revenue;
REVG (M, P, S, GN) = Revenue of grassland (maize, potatoes, sugar beets,
grain).
Revenues of the five different crops are calculated by multiplying yields, prices, and
cultivated area respectively.
REVX = YX * PX * HAX (6.4)
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Where: REVX = Revenue of crop X;
YX = Yield of crop X;
PX = Price of crop X;
HAX = Hectares of crop X.
The hectares that are engaged by the different crops are noted above and the prices of
the crops are shown in table 6.2. The yields are calculated by the estimated functions with
groundwater table as explanatory variable. The groundwater table variable has a lower limit
of 30cm below soil surface. According to Schothorst who is mentioned by Feddes and Van
Wijk (1976), the bearing strength of the soil tends to be adequate if the groundwater table is
deeper than 30cm below soil surface. This implies that a groundwater level that is higher than
30cm below soil surface eliminates agricultural activities. The upper level is 200cm below
soil surface. The Gams specification of the model is given in appendix F.
Results
The amount of maximized total revenue for 100 hectares agricultural area is 329150 guilders.
The optimal groundwater level at this point is 81.86 cm below soil surface. The distribution of
total revenue over the five different crops is shown in figure 6.4.
Figure 6.4 Revenue of crops distribution in guilders per 100 hectare agricultural area
For the further analysis it is more practical to use values per one hectare. Hence, the
estimated total revenue of 100 hectare is divided by 100. In this way the proportional con-
tributions of the different crops to total revenue stay the same and a weighted average of
total revenue per hectare has been obtained. Maximized total revenue per hectare at a
groundwater table of 81.86 cm below soil surface is hence 3,291.50 guilders.
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Total revenue as a function of groundwater table
In order to obtain a curve for total revenue per hectare with respect to groundwater table, the
model that is described above needs a slight modification. Instead of letting the model choose
the optimal groundwater table, the groundwater table is set as a fixed parameter beforehand.
In this way the different levels of groundwater table can be determined. Subsequently, the
model calculates total revenue that is related to the determined groundwater table. The curve
that is obtained by this procedure is shown in figure 6.5 in the next section.
A quantitative specification of this curve can be derived by the regression of the calcu-
lated total revenues per hectare on the groundwater table. The function for total revenue with
respect to groundwater table is specified as follows.
TOTREV = 2339.025 + 26.269*GW - 0.215*GW2 + 0.00045*GW3 (6.5)
6.3.2 Introduction of the value-of-nature
In order to emphasize the competition between nature and agriculture a value-of-nature index
is introduced. The formula for the value-of-nature index is adapted from s'Jacobs and Wilmar
(1996). It has to be mentioned that this formula is only one example for the description of an
index for the value of nature. This formula is the only one that has been come across in the
studied literature and no specific investigations have been carried out in order to find other
descriptions.
)100
GW2.0(e*100VNI −= (6.6)
Where: VNI: Value-of-nature index
GW: Groundwater table
In this function it is assumed that measurable damage to nature only occurs if the
groundwater table gets lower than 20 cm below soil surface. Figure 6.5 shows the value-of-
nature index (equation 6.6) and total revenue per hectare of agricultural production with re-
spect to groundwater table (equation 6.5).
The different groundwater levels with the related value-of-nature index, total revenue of
agricultural production and losses in total revenue of agricultural production are listed in table
6.8.
At groundwater table 81.86cm below soil surface where total agricultural revenue is
maximized is the value-of-nature index 53.9%. The losses that occur to agricultural revenue if
the groundwater table increases respectively decreases are listed in the last column. Through
the quantification of the losses to agriculture the amount of compensation payment at different
groundwater levels that has to be paid to the farmers, is indicated.
It was mentioned above that the bearing strength of the soil for agricultural production
is only adequate at a groundwater level of 30 cm below soil surface. This explains that there is
no production at a groundwater level of 20 cm. In this example with the assumed function for
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the value-of-nature index it is therefore not possible to continue with agricultural activities
and at the same time keeping the value-of-nature index at 100%.
Figure 6.5 Value-of-nature index and total revenue of agricultural production
Table 6.8 Value-of-nature index, total revenue of agricultural production (guilders/ha), and losses in total
revenue of agricultural production (guilders/ha) with respect to groundwater table

Groundwater table Value-of-nature Total revenue of Losses in total
in cm below soil index in % agricultural production agricultural revenue
surface (guilders/ha) (guilders/ha)

20 100 no production 3,291.5
30 90.5 2,945.4 346.1
40 81.9 3,073.9 217.6
50 74.1 3,169.9 121.6
60 67 3,236.4 55.1
70 60.6 3,275.9 15.6
80 54.9 3,291.1 0.4
81.86 53.9 3,291.5 0
90 49.6 3,284.8 6.7
100 44.9 3,259.5 32
110 40.6 3,218 73.5
120 36.8 3,163 128.5
130 33.3 3,097.2 194.3
140 30.1 3,023.2 268.3

75
Monetary value-of-nature
According to social welfare theory, the optimal groundwater level is at the point where the
losses to total agriculture revenue equal the gains for nature while changing the groundwater
level by one unit which is one centimeter. This condition requires a monetary valuation of
nature. Several techniques for the economic valuation of natural areas and biodiversity have
been developed. The most popular examples are the Contingent Valuation Method, the He-
donic Pricing Method, and the Travel Cost Method. (For a detailed description of different
valuation techniques see, for example, Perman et al. (1996), and Pearce and Moran (1994)).
For further analysis it is assumed that one hectare of natural area is valuated with 500 guild-
ers. This value is taken from the estimation of the willingness to pay for the preservation
benefits of a blanket bog area in Scotland that has been carried out by Hanley and Craig
(Pearce and Moran, 1994). They revealed a value for the willingness to pay of 164.68 pounds
per hectare, which are approximately 500 guilders per hectare. Blanket bog belongs to the
ecosystem type of wetlands and is therefore a reasonable approach to the type of ecosystem
that is found in the desiccated natural areas in the Netherlands.
It has to be emphasized that the valuation of natural area with 500 guilders per hectare
is only an assumption. A valuation of the affected natural areas in the Netherlands ought to be
carried out beforehand in order to obtain reliable results. The assumption that the natural area
is evaluated with 500 guilders per hectare serves mainly as an illustration for the method that
is used in the analysis.
Furthermore it is assumed that the value-of-nature index that is shown in equation 6.6
can be replace by the monetary valuation. This means that a value-of-nature index of 100%
corresponds to 500 guilders per hectare, which implies that this is the value that is attached to
an intact natural area. Equation 6.6 can hence be transformed into the following equation.
)100
GW2.0(e*500MVN −= (6.7)
Where: MVN = Monetary value-of-nature;
GW = Groundwater table.
By using equation 6.7 the monetary value-of-nature can be calculated for different
groundwater tables. At a groundwater table of 81.86 cm below soil surface, where total reve-
nue of agricultural production is maximized, the monetary value-of-nature is 269.35 guilders
per hectare. The losses to nature are at that point 230.65 guilders per hectare. These two key
numbers are listed in table 6.9 further down.
6.3.3 Equalizing marginal benefit and marginal costs
In order to reach a situation that is optimal from society's point of view, taxes or charges
could be introduced. Farmers have to pay taxes or charges on a groundwater table that
would be optimal for agricultural production but below the social optimum. The social op-
timum is there where the losses to agriculture are equal to the gains for nature or where the
marginal costs for agriculture are equal to the marginal benefits of nature. This point can
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be derived by equalizing the absolute values of the slopes of the functions for total agri-
cultural revenue (equation 6.5) and for the monetary value-of-nature (equation 6.7). In
mathematical terms, it is equalizing the absolute values of the first derivatives of these
functions with respect to the groundwater table:
GW
MVN
GW
TOTREV
∂
∂
=
∂
∂ (6.8)
The first derivatives of the two functions are as follows:
2GW*00135.0GW*43.0269.26
GW
TOTREV
+−=
∂
∂ (6.9)
)100
GW2.0(e*500*
100
1
GW
MVN −
−=
∂
∂ (6.10)
The absolute values of these two first derivatives are depicted in figure 6.6.
Figure 6.6 First derivatives of total agricultural revue function and absolute values of monetary value-of-nature
function
The groundwater table where losses to agriculture equal gains for nature can be ob-
tained by solving equation 6.8. The optimal combined groundwater table is in this case 68.4
cm below soil surface. The marginal losses to agricultural respectively the marginal gains to
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nature that occur by changing the groundwater level by one cm at that point are 3.08 guilders.
Agricultural revenue at 68.4 cm below soil surface amounts to 3,273.94 guilders per hectare.
With the maximum total revenue of 3,291.5 guilders per hectare, this implies absolute losses
to agricultural of 17.56 guilders per hectare. The monetary value-of-nature at 68.4 cm below
soil surface is 308.16 guilders per hectare. With the maximum value-of-nature of 500 guilders
per hectare, this implies absolute losses to nature of 191.84 guilders per hectare. These key
numbers are summarized in table 6.9 further down. Losses to agriculture are 17.56 guilders
per hectare. In the case of taxes and charges, the tax rate respectively the heights of the
charges must lie above the amount of losses to agriculture in order to stimulate farmers to re-
frain from a lowering of the groundwater table. The tax rate/heights of charges must hence lie
above 17.56 guilders per hectare. The same results are obtained with the maximization of
joint revenue of agriculture and nature.
The optimal combined groundwater table and hence the proper tax rate/heights of
charges varies according to the monetary value-of-nature. A sensitivity will give insight into
the range of variation of the optimal combined groundwater table if the monetary value-of-
nature changes.
Sensitivity analysis
It was mentioned above that the valuation of the natural area is an assumption only. The
monetary value of a natural area will differ anyway dependent on the respective valuation
method used. In order to get an idea about the scope of variation of the results due to
changes in the valuation of nature, a sensitivity analysis has been carried out with respect
to the specification of the monetary value-of-nature function. Four different variations of
the monetary value-of-nature function used for the analysis above have been tested. The
variations only describe a higher valuation of the natural area. Lower valuations are not
taken into account.
1. The monetary value of an intact natural area is 750 guilders per hectare instead of
500 guilders per hectare:
)100
GW2.0(e*750MVN −= (6.11)
2. The monetary value of an intact natural area is 1,000 guilders per hectare instead of
500 guilders per hectare:
)100
GW2.0(e*1000MVN −= (6.12)
3. The value-of-nature decreases at a faster rate as the groundwater table decreases:
2
)100
GW2.0(e*500MVN =
− (6.13)
4. The monetary value of an intact natural area is 750 guilders per hectare instead of 500
guilders per hectare and the value-of-nature decreases at a faster rate as the groundwater
table decreases:
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2
)100
GW2.0(e*750MVN =
− (6.14)
The results of the sensitivity analysis are summarized in table 6.9. (Recall that the opti-
mal groundwater table for agricultural production is 81.86 cm below soil surface).
The figures in table 6.9 show a clear variation in the different key numbers with re-
spect to the different specifications of the monetary value-of-nature function. Losses to
nature at an optimal groundwater level for agriculture range from 230.65 guilders per hec-
tare to 532.35 guilders per hectare. This is a difference of 301.7 guilders per hectare.
Table 6.9 Results of the sensitivity analysis on the specification of the monetary value-of-nature function

Key numbers Specification of monetary value-of-nature function

)100
GW2.0(e*v −
2
)100
GW2.0(e*v 
−
 "
v = 500 v = 750 v = 1,000 v = 500 v = 750
(reference)

MVN at gw 81.86 cm
  bss in guilders/ha 269.35 404.02 538.7 145.1 217.65
Losses to nature at 81.86
  cm bss in guilders/ha 230.65 345.98 461.3 354.9 532.35
Combined optimal gw
  in cm bss 68.4 61 53.1 64.3 48.9
Marginal losses/gains
  in guilders/ha 3.08 4.98 7.18 4.2 8.41
Agric. revenue at
  combined optimal gw
  in guilders/ha 3,273.94 3,243.56 3,195.07 3,258.84 3,162.09
Losses to agriculture
  in guilders/ha 17.56 47.94 96.43 32.66 129.41
Value-of-nature at com-
  bined gw in guilders/ha 308.16 497.49 718.33 206.25 421.06
Losses to nature inguilders/ha 191.84 252.51 281.67 293.75 328.46

Abbreviations: mvn = monetary value-of-nature; gw = groundwater table; bss = below soil surface.
The point where marginal losses to agriculture equal marginal gains to nature, is here
described as the optimal combined groundwater table. As the monetary value-of-nature per
hectare increases respectively the value-of-nature decreases at a faster rate, the optimal
combined groundwater table increases. The optimal combined groundwater table varies
from 68.4 cm below soil surface to 48.6 cm below soil surface.
According to the variation of the optimal combined groundwater table, losses to agri-
culture and nature are changing. Losses to agriculture vary from 17.56 guilders per hectare
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to 129.41 guilders per hectare. This is a variation of 111.85 guilders per hectare. Losses to
nature range from 191.84 guilders per hectare to 328.46 guilders per hectare, which is a
difference of 136.62 guilders per hectare.
According to the wide range of variation of losses to agriculture the optimal tax
rate/heights of charges has to vary as well if farmers are stimulated to refrain from a lowering
of the groundwater table. The optimal tax rate/heights of charges always has to lie above the
losses to agriculture.
6.4 Concluding Remarks
The sensitivity analysis shows that the monetary valuation of the natural area plays an impor-
tant role in the determination of the groundwater table that is optimal from the point of view
of social welfare theory. Losses to agriculture are especially important for the introduction of
taxes and charges. The wide range of losses to agriculture, namely from 17.56 guilders per
hectare to 129.41 guilders per hectare, shows that the determination of the value-of-nature is
quite substantial for the introduction of the proper tax rate/heights of charges.
The highest optimal combined groundwater table calculated with the different specifi-
cations of the monetary value-of-nature function is 48.9 cm below soil surface. It is uncertain
if this if sufficient for an appropriate reduction of desiccation. With the method of finding the
optimal combined groundwater table by equalizing marginal costs and marginal benefits a
higher monetary valuation of nature is needed in order to reach a higher optimal combined
groundwater table.
The valuation of a natural area is region specific. This means that it depends on several
factors. Some of these factors are the value of the respective ecosystem, the attractiveness for
recreation activities, the distance to cities or the valuation technique applied. The value of
natural areas might hence differ from region to region, which is again a sign for the region
specific approach that has to be taken in anti-desiccation projects.
Improvements for the model
The estimations of the functions for crop yields due to the groundwater table are based on a
data set constructed with the help of depression tables. In order to improve the persuasiveness
of the model, validations by means of empirical data should be carried out. Furthermore, the
estimations only include groundwater level as an explanatory variable. Other influencing
factors on crop yields such as fertilization, sort of crop (brand) or weather conditions have not
been taken into account. In the frame of an empirical estimation of the yield functions, these
other explanatory factors should be considered as well.
The costs arising for agriculture due to an increase of the groundwater table only in-
clude pure losses to crop yields that can be calculated with the estimated function of the
regression analysis. It should be mentioned that there are more costs that may arise due to
higher groundwater tables. A decline of the bearing strength of the soil in springtime implies
that cattle have to stay in the shed for a longer time. This means that farmers need more feed,
which can be provided either by purchasing or by buying more land for silage.
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The monetary value-of-nature is an important factor in the determination of the optimal
combined groundwater table. A valuation of the desiccated areas in the Netherlands by means
of established valuation techniques (Willingness To Pay, Contingent Valuation Method, He-
donic Pricing Method, Travel Cost Method) would increase the reliability of the results.
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7. Conclusions and recommendations
7.1 Introduction
The final chapter of this report presents conclusions and recommendations. The conclusion
will be given as answers on the questions that are put as objectives in the introductory chapter
1. The main objective was:
What is the role of economic instruments in Dutch water management and to what extent can
they contribute to a reduction of desiccation?
Before coming to the main objective, answers will be given on the sub-questions.
The recommendations do partly refer to bottlenecks encountered during the research
and will give some indications for further research. The recommendations follow directly on
the conclusions under the different sub-questions.
What is the situation of desiccation in the Netherlands? Are there any specialties with respect
to water in the Netherlands that have to be taken into account in management strategies?
What is the situation of the different water users in the Netherlands?
Discharge and drainage of superfluous water cause 60% of desiccation, groundwater extrac-
tion 30% and other reasons 10%. Desiccation is a major reason why traditional management
of the hydrological system, which is mainly adjusted to benefits for agriculture, is called in
question. On regional scale, rearrangements of the hydrological system are seen as the most
important measure against desiccation, whereas reduction in groundwater extraction activities
seems to take a minor position. However, on local scale groundwater extraction can have an
important impact on desiccation. A successful policy against desiccation certainly has to con-
sider that circumstances and causes of the problem can differ from location to location.
Solutions are hence region specific, which means that there is no nation wide solution to the
problem.
The water problem in the Netherlands is contradictory. On the one hand, much effort is
put in getting rid of superfluous water and on the other hand problems are coming up with
water scarcity. The problem lies in the scarcity of good quality water. Good quality water is
scarce from an economic point of view because the treatment of surface water is still expen-
sive, at least more expensive than the extraction of groundwater, which costs do not yet
include the external effects that occur by the extraction of groundwater and that becomes visi-
ble as desiccation.
A special characteristic of the Netherlands is the high density of economic activity.
Many users of water resources with different demands on quality and quantity items of water
compete for the resource on a spatially limited area. This is an indication that external effects
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produced by different users on their competitors are more evident. The fact that a limited area
has only a limited underground area and hence less space available for the storage of ground-
water in combination with high population density puts additional pressure on scarcity of
good-quality water.
What are the special economic characteristics of water as a natural resource?
Water belongs to the common property resources and experiences the tragedy of the com-
mons. An important characteristic of water is its diversity of use. The diversity of use
becomes also obvious in the Netherlands where many users have different demands on the
quality and quantity of water. The manifold application possibilities of water make it difficult
to attach a proper value to water resources. Instream uses, where water is used directly for
consumption or for production processes are easier to evaluate than offstream uses, such as
fishery, nature conservation, navigation or recreation. The problem of attaching a proper value
to water resources entails the production of externalities arising from economic activities that
make use of water resources. Desiccation can be interpreted as an externality arising from ag-
ricultural activities that do not seem to pay the proper price for draining the fields.
An optimal allocation of natural resources is at that point where marginal net benefits
are equal across all users. This is also established as the main objective in the Dutch ground-
water law. If marginal net benefit has to be equalized in order to reach a social optimum, the
key problem is thus to identify the actual marginal net benefit of all different users of
groundwater. A reliable identification of the actual marginal net benefit of all different users
in the Netherlands is still lacking. This is mainly due to the absence of dependable data of
consumption of private extractors and to the low price that private extractors have to pay for
the water. Intensified research on these topics would be advisable to find the actual marginal
net benefits of the different user categories in order to be able to determine an optimal alloca-
tion of the water resource.
What can be found about managing water scarcity through the introduction of economic in-
struments in international literature? Are there any differences in the situation of water
between other countries and the Netherlands?
Several instruments to economize water use can be found in international literature. The in-
struments that are especially interesting are those that are based on market forces. These
instruments are pricing reforms, tradable rights, effluent and pollution charges, subsidies and
taxes. These instruments aim at the resource itself by increasing its economic value in order to
approach an optimal allocation. The introduction of economic instruments demands the
proper enabling conditions, which means that it harmonizes with the organizational and ad-
ministrative conditions. A policy mix of the different economic instruments is in many cases
more effective than the introduction of a single one. While introducing economic instruments
or policy mixes, it is important to take into account the prevailing social, economical and po-
litical circumstances in the respective country.
It is striking that most of the examples of economic instruments found in international
literature stem from arid regions where absolute water scarcity is evident and where water is
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the limiting factor. Knowing Dutch weather conditions and Dutch history that is characterized
by fighting against water for land reclamation it becomes obvious that absolute water scarcity
is not the actual problem in the Netherlands. The effort that is put in getting rid of water
proves that water in general is abundant in the Netherlands. The basic problem lies in the mi-
nor quality of surface water, which implies high costs for its treatment and purification. Minor
quality of surface water entails that good quality groundwater is used for low-value applica-
tions such as the irrigation of grassland. This indicates that the quality and quantity of water is
closely related to each other, which means that research on the quantity of water should nec-
essarily take quality issues into account as well.
The following sub-questions refer to the quantitative part of this report.
Finding a function that describes the relationship between agricultural crop yields and the
groundwater table.
Five different functions for five different crops (grassland, maize, potatoes, sugar beets and
grain) have been estimated. The relationship between crop yields and groundwater table can
be described with a cubic functional form. The crop with the lowest optimal groundwater ta-
ble is grassland with 75.3 cm below soil surface (followed by potatoes, then grain, then maize
and finally sugar beets with the highest optimum of 89.47 cm below soil surface). The func-
tions indicate that a higher groundwater table than the optimum has a more negative effect on
crop yields than a groundwater table that is lower than the optimum.
Finding the optimal groundwater level for agricultural production and indicating losses to
agriculture that occur through higher groundwater tables.
In this simplified model the optimal groundwater table for agricultural production that is cal-
culated by maximizing total agricultural revenue is 81.86 cm below soil surface. The function
that describes total revenue of all crops with respect to groundwater table exhibits losses to
agriculture and hence the costs that occur to agriculture due to higher groundwater tables than
the optimum. These losses can be taken as an indication for compensation payments for farm-
ers if agreements have been made about an increase of the groundwater table.
The costs that are calculated in this model do only include pure losses to crop yields.
Other cost items such as the additional amount of feed for the cattle needed because of a
longer shed period should be taken into account as well.
How can an optimal groundwater table for both, agricultural and nature, be obtained?
Can economic instruments be introduced to reach this optimal combined groundwater table?
Theory says that social optimum is at that point, where marginal costs equal marginal bene-
fits. Hence, for the attainment of an optimal combined groundwater table the method of
equalizing marginal costs to agriculture and marginal benefits for nature is used. The objec-
tive of economic instruments is to approximate an optimal allocation of resources in order to
maximize social welfare. Theoretically, economic instruments, as for instance taxes or
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charges, could be put on a lowering of the groundwater table below the social optimum. The
instruments would have to aim at farmers because they benefit from the groundwater table
lowering. In order to be effective, taxes or charges have to be higher than the losses to agri-
culture.
In the hypothetical model in chapter 6, the optimal combined groundwater table lies,
with the monetary value-of-nature of 500 guilders per hectare, at 68.4 cm below soil surface.
Agricultural losses are at this point 17.56 guilders per hectare. An effective tax rate or heights
of charges has therefore to exceed 17.56 guilders per hectare.
How sensitive is the optimal combined groundwater table with respect to the value of nature?
The monetary valuation of nature plays an important role in the determination of the optimal
combined groundwater table. The level of the optimal combined groundwater table deter-
mines losses to agriculture and hence the proper tax rate/heights of charges. The sensitivity
analysis on the monetary value-of-nature for this hypothetical model shows that the optimal
combined groundwater table increases if the value-of-nature per hectare increases respectively
the value-of-nature per hectare decreases at a faster rate as the groundwater table falls. In the
example the optimal combined groundwater table ranges from 68.4 cm below soil surface to
48.9 cm below soil surface. Accordingly, losses to agriculture vary from 17.56 guilders per
hectare to 129.41 guilders per hectare. The wide range of losses to agriculture gives an indi-
cation of the importance of the value-of-nature on the proper tax-rate/heights of charges.
Since the valuation of nature in the model is an assumption only, a valuation of the
desiccated areas in the Netherlands by means of established valuation techniques (Willingness
To Pay, Contingent Valuation Method, Hedonic Pricing Method, Travel Cost Method) would
definitely contribute to an approach of the 'real world' situation. The valuation of a natural
area can differ from region to region. This means that it depends on factors such as the bio-
logical value of the specific ecosystem, the attractiveness for recreation activities, the distance
to cities or the valuation technique applied. This is again an argument for the region specific
approach that has to be taken in the reduction of the desiccation problem.
Answer to the main objective
What is the role of economic instruments in Dutch water management and to what extent can
they contribute to a reduction of desiccation?
Desiccation can be interpreted as an externality arising from intensive drainage and dis-
charge of water and extraction of groundwater. Economic instruments can be used to
internalize externalities by increasing the economic value (costs) of water discharges re-
spectively groundwater extraction/use.
The application of economic instruments to water use/extraction can be promising in
the Netherlands. With respect to the fact that the metering percentage of Dutch households
will be 100% in the near future, especially the price instrument and the instrument 'Water-
spoor', which is a combination of prices and sewage charges, could be effective to
stimulate a more conscious use of water. In the case of agriculture, the successful applica-
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tion of economic instruments needs some juridical changes beforehand. The increase of
water prices stimulates farmers to build private wells in order to avoid higher charges. This
advantage and the fact that actual water consumption of farmers is not easy control, im-
plies that without changing these conditions, the price instrument is not very effective.
However, groundwater extraction causes only 30% of the desiccation problem and it
is even expected that reductions or stops of extractions only have a minor effect if drainage
capacities remain high in the same area. This does not mean that economic instruments
should not be applied to extraction/use: it alerts people about the real value of water and
about increasing water scarcity also on worldwide level that will play an very important
role in the near future.
The application of economic instruments to stimulate higher groundwater tables would
have to occur through hydrological measures. Hydrological measures as they are defined here
are rearrangements of the surface water system that influence the groundwater level. The
main hydrological measures are the reduction of drainage capacity on agricultural land, the
building of controllable barrages and the reduction of the depths of ditches. The introduction
of hydrological measures can affect a whole area, which implies that several farmers are af-
fected at the same time. The instrument must therefore be applied to groups of farmers.
Chapter 6 showed a theoretical approach to the introduction of taxes or charges on a
lowering of the groundwater table. I expect that in practice administrative and organizational
problems may come up with the introduction of economic instruments to hydrological meas-
ures. Difficulties could come up in negotiations with whole groups of farmers, the fair value
attached to natural areas and the determination of the proper tax rate/heights of charges. De-
spite the possible obstacles, it would be interesting to start a test project in which economic
instruments are applied to hydrological measures. Such a test project would require precise
knowledge of the hydrological system, the biological circumstances of the ecosystem, the role
of the different users of water resources and the technical possibilities to reduce desiccation in
the test area beforehand.
Final remark
Especially in the quantitative part of this report it became clear that a pure economic approach
to the questions around the desiccation problem is difficult. All aspects concerning changes in
the hydrological system require a clear and intensive knowledge of the processes of ground-
water in the soil and the complex system between surface water and groundwater.
Furthermore, the impacts of the changes in the hydrological system on agricultural yields as
well as biodiversity have to be identified. This demands a deep insight into the sensitivity of
agricultural crops to water supply and the biological relationships of the different ecosystems.
For a successful and reliable strategies against desiccation an interdisciplinary approach with
hydrologists, soil scientists, crop scientist and biologist is therefore strongly recommended.
86
87
References
Anderson, F.R., A.V. Kneese, P.D. Reed, S. Taylor and R.B. Stevenson, Environmental im-
provement through economic incentives. The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and
London, 1977.
Baltissen, J.H.P. and J.J. Van der Sluis, 'Goed nieuws voor de verdrogingbestrijding' ('Good
news about the reduction of desiccation'). In: H2O (1998) 10, pp. 21-23.
Baumol, W.J. and W.E. Oats, The theory of environmental policy; externalities, public out-
lays and quality of life. Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs 1975.
Becker, N., 'Value of moving from central planning to market system: Lessons from the Isre-
ali Water Sector'. In:  Agricultural Economics (1995) 12, pp. 11-21.
Beugelink, G.P. and F.A.M. Claessen, Operationalisatie van de 25%-doelstellingen Ver-
droging; maatregelen, kosten en effecten (Implementing the 25% target reduction of
desiccation: measures, costs and effects). Report 715001001. RIVM, Bilthoven, 1995.
Beugelink, G.P., L. Hendriks, M.R. Hoogerwerf, R.J. vd Velde and J.G. Veldkamp, Gebiede-
natlas, een eerste inventarisatie (Atlas of the region, a first stocktaking). Report 11901014.
RIVM, Bilthoven, 1995.
Blumenthal, K.P. 'Physical aspects of the water resources system'. In: R. Koudstaal, H.A.
Pennekamp and J. Wesseling (eds.) Planning for water resources management in the Neth-
erlands. Delft Hydraulics/Institute for Land and Water Management Research, Wageningen,
1988.
Bogges, W., R. Lacewell and D. Zilberman, 'Economics of water use in agriculture'. In: G.A.
Carlson, D. Zilberman and J.A. Miranowski (eds), Agricultural and Environmental Resource
Economics. New York, Oxford University Press, 1993.
Bressers, J.Th.A., 'Instrumentatieproblemen: theoretische en praktische inzichten'. (problems
with instrumentation: theoretical and practical insights.) In: P. Glasbergen (ed.),  Milieu-
beleid: theorie en praktijk. VUGA, Den Haag, 1989, pp. 151-170.
Brouwer, F.M., C.H.G. Daatselaar, J.P.P.J. Welten and J.H.M. Wijnands, Landbouw, milieu
en economie (Agriculture, environment and economy). Periodieke Reportage 68-94. LEI-
DLO, The Hague, 1996.
88
Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek, Watervoorziening van bedrijven. Voorburg/Heerlen, 1986,
1991.
Colby Saliba, B., 'Do Water Markets 'work'? Market transfers and trade-offs in the South-
western State'. In: Water Resources Research 23 (1987) 7, pp. 1113-1122.
Colby, B.G., K. Crandall and D.B. Bush, 'Water rights transactions: Market values and price
dispersions'. In: Water Resources Research 29 (1993) 6, pp. 1565-1572.
Dijkgraaf, E., E.G. van de Mortel, M. Varkevisser, R. de Jong, A. Nentjes and D. Wiersma,
'Meer marktwerking maakt het water goedkoper' ('Cheaper water through market forces'). In:
Economisch Statistische Berichten (1997) 22 October, pp. 796-800.
Dijkgraaf, E., R. de Jong, E.G. van de Mortel, A. Nentjes, M. Varkevisser and D. Wiersma,
Mogelijkheden tot marktwerking in de Nederlandse watersector (Possibilities for market
forces in the Dutch water sector). Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 1997.
Duurzaam Bouwen, VEWIN: water besparen, maar niet tegen verdroging (VEWIN: saving
water, but not against desiccation). March 1998.
Ee, van G. and U. Pakes, Reductie grondwater onttrekking Oost-Brabant (Reduction of
groundwater extraction in east Brabant). TNO, Delft, 1994.
FAO, Reforming water resources policy: A guide to methods, processes and practices. FAO
Irrigation and Drainage Paper 52, Rome, 1995.
Feddes, R.A. and A.L.M. van Wijk, 'An integrated model-approach to the effect of water
management on crop yield'. In: Agricultural Water Management. 1 (1976), pp. 3-20.
Feddes, R.A., R.W.R. Koopmans and J.C. van Dam, Agrohydrology. Reader. Department of
environmental science - Sub-department Water Resources, Wageningen Agricultural Univer-
sity, 1997.
Frederick, K.D. and A. Kneese, 'Reallocation by markets and prices'. In: A.V. Kneese (ed.),
Natural Resource Economics. Edward Elgar, 1995, pp. 138-162.
Gazmuri Schleyer, R. and M.W. Rosegrant, 'Chilean water policy: The role of water rights;
Institutions and Markets'. Water Resources Development 12 (1996) 1, pp. 33-48.
Gibbons, D.C., The economic value of water; A study from resources for the future. Wash-
ington D.C., 1986.
Gisser M. and D.A. Sanchez, 'Competition versus optimal control in groundwater pumping'.
In: Water Resources Research 16 (1980) 4, pp. 638-42.
89
Hoogeveen, M.W., V.C. Bouwman and J. Dijk, Herstelmaatregelen voor verdroging (Recov-
ery measures for desiccation). Interne Nota 446. LEI-DLO, The Hague, 1996.
Hommes and van 't Hof. In: P. Glasbergen (ed.) Milieubeleid: theorie en praktijk. VUGA,
The Hague, 1989.
Howe, C.W., D.R. Schurmeier and W. Douglas Shaw Jr., 'Innovative approaches to water al-
location: The potential for water markets. In: Water Resources Research 22 (1986) 4, pp. 439-
445.
Israel, M. and J.R. Lund, 'Recent California water transfers: implications for water manage-
ment'. In: Natural Resources Journal 35 (1995) 1, pp. 1-32.
s'Jacob, R. and E. Wilmar, Een regulerende heffing op grondwater voor het tegengaan van
verdroging (A regulating tax on groundwater for reducing desiccation). MSc Thesis at the
Wageningen Agricultural University, Department of General Economics, April 1996.
Jalink, M.H. and B.A.J. Meeuwissen, 'Verdroging: de oplossingen liggen klaar' ('Desiccation:
the solutions are ready'). In: H2O (1998) 13, pp. 30-33.
Killick, A., 'Notes on macroeconomic adjustments in the environment'. In: J.T. Winpenny
(ed.), Development Research: The Environmental Challenge. ODI, London, 1991.
Kiewiet, A.T. and H.A. van Dam, 'Waterspoor; instrument voor een duurzame waterketen!'
('Waterspoor: an instrument for a sustainable water chain'). In: H2O (1998) 13, pp. 21-22.
Kooreman. P., 'De prijsgevoeligheid van huishoudelijk watergebruik' ('The price elasticity of
domestic water use'). In: Economisch Statische Berichten (1993), 24 February, pp. 181-185.
Linderhof, V., An econometric analysis of household demand for energy and water in the
Netherlands. Individual paper. University of Groningen, 1997.
Martin, W.E. and S. Kulakowski, 'Water price as a policy variable in managing urban water
use: Tucson, Arizona'. In: Water Resources Research 27 (1991) 2, pp. 157-166.
Ministry of Transport and Public Works, Water in the Netherlands: A time for action. Na-
tional policy document on water management. Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, The
Hague, 1989.
Ministry of Transport and Public Works Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, Watersys-
teemverkenningen (Exploration of the water system). The Hague, 1996.
Neher, P.A., Natural resource economics: conservation and exploitation. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1990.
90
Nieswiadomy, M.L., 'Estimating urban residential water demand: effects of price structures,
conservation, and education'. In: Water Resources Research 28 (1992) 3, pp. 609-615.
NRC Handelsblad, Drinkwater geen schaars goed. (Drinking water is not a scarce good.).
20-11-1997.
OECD, Pricing of water services. Paris, 1987.
OECD, OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Netherlands. Paris, 1995.
Olmstead, J., D. Sundings, D. Parker, R. Howitt and D. Zilberman, Water marketing in the
'90s - Entering the electronic age; choices. Third Quarter, 1997, pp.15-19.
Pearce, D. and D. Moran, The economic value of biodiversity. Earthscan Publications Lim-
ited, London, 1994.
Perman, R., M. Yue and J. McGilvray, Natural resource and environmental economics.
Longman, London and New York, 1996.
Projectteam Vierde Nota Waterhuishouding, Schetsboek voor een vierde nota water-
huishouding (Sketchbook for the forth note on water management.) Direct Dutch, The Hague,
1996.
Raad voor Verkeer en Waterstaat, Raad voor het Milieubeheer ('s-Gravenhage), Raad voor
het Natuurbeheer (Utrecht), and Raad voor Openluchtrecreatie (Amersfoort), Samen over
water: Advies ten behoeve van de vierde nota waterhuishouding. (Together about water: ad-
vice for the benefit of the forth note on water management.) The Hague, 1996.
Randall, A., 'Property entitlements and pricing policies for a maturing water economy'. In:
Australian Journal of Agricultural Economic 25 (1981) 3, pp. 192-220.
Rijksinsituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu (RIVM), Milieubalans '97. (Environmental
balance '97.). Samsom H.D. Tjeenk Willink bv, Alphen aan de Rijn, 1997.
Rosegrant, M.W., Water resources in the twenty-first century: challenges and implications for
action, food, agriculture, and the environment. Discussion paper 20. International Food Pol-
icy Research Institute, Washington D.C., 1997.
Runhaar, J., M.A. Graafland and G.P Beugelink, 'Evaluatie van het landelijk ver-
drogingsbeleid' ('Evaluation of the national desiccation policy') In: Milieu (1997) 3, pp. 115-
125.
Saeijs, H., Levend water in een wereldstad (Water in a Metropolis). Inaugural speech. Eras-
mus University Rotterdam, 21 September 1995.
91
SC-DLO (Staring Centrum), Landschapsecologische kartering van Nederland (Landscape
ecological mapping of the Netherlands). CD-ROM. Wageningen, 1997.
Spulber, N. and A. Sabbaghi, Economics of water resources: From regulation to privatiza-
tion. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994.
Staalduinen, L.C. van, M.W. Hoogeveen, C. Ploeger and J. Dijk, Heffing van grondwater-
belastingen via een forfait. Publicatie 3.163. LEI-DLO, The Hague, 1996.
Tietenberg, T., Environmental and Natural Resource Economics. Harper Collins, New York,
1992.
Verbruggen, H., 'Milieudruk in Nederland'. In: Economisch Statistische Berichten (1995) 1,
pp. 990-991.
VROM, (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer), Geef
water de ruimte. (Give water space.) Den Haag, 1997.
VROM et al., (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer;
Ministerie van Economische Zaken; Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij en
Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat), Nota Milieu en Economie. (Paper on environment and
economy.) The Hague, 1997.
Wesseling, J., De betekenis van water voor de landbouw. (The meaning of water for agricul-
ture.) Miscellaneous Reprints 183. Institute for Land and Water Management Research,
Wageningen, 1976.
Werkgroep HELP, De invloed van de waterhuishouding op de landbouwkundige productie.
(The influence of water management on agricultural production.) Mededelingen Landin-
richtingsdienst 176. Utrecht, 1987.
Wijk, A.L.M. van, R.A. Feddes, J.G. Wesseling and J. Buitendijk, Effecten van grondsoort en
ontwatering op de opbrengsten van akkerbouwgewassen. (Effects of soil type and drainage on
the yields of arable crops.). Rapport 31. Instituut voor Cultuurtechniek en Waterhuishouding
(ICW), Wageningen, 1988.
Winpenny, J., Managing water as an economic resource. Routledge, London and New York,
1994.
Young, R.A. and R.H. Haveman, Economics of water resources: A survey, handbook of natu-
ral resource and energy economics. Vol. II, (ed. Kneese and Sweeney). Elsevier Science
Publisher B.V., 1985, pp. 465-529.
92
Young, R.A., 'Why are there so few transactions among water users?'. In: American Journal
of Agricultural Economics 68 (1986) 5, pp. 1143-1151.
93
Appendix A List of abbreviations
AHG Averaged Highest Groundwater Level
ALG Averaged Lowest Groundwater Level
BSS Below Soil Surface
ECA Eastern Cattle Area
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GW Groundwater Table
HA Hectare
kVEM kilo Voeder Eenheid Melk (kilo feed unit milk)
MFC Marginal Factor Costs
MVN Monetary Value-of-Nature
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
P Price
PPP Polluter-Pays-Principle
Q, q Quantity (input of water)
REVG Revenue of Grassland
REVM Revenue of Maize
REVP Revenue of Potatoes
REVS Revenue of Sugar Beets
REVGN Revenue of Grain
RIVM Rijksinstituut voor volksgezondheid en milieu (National Institute of Public Health
and the Environment)
SMC Social Marginal Costs
TOTREV Total Revenue
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UPP User-Pays-Principle
VEWIN Vereniging van exploitante waterleidingsbedrijfen in Nederland (Association of
Dutch Drinking Water Supplier)
VMP Value of Marginal Product
VNI Value-of-Nature Index
VROM Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu (Ministry of
Housing, Physical Planning and Environment)
Y Yield
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Appendix B Derivation of hotelling's rule
(Based on Perman, 1996, p. 138)
The Hotelling's Rule can be derived by applying the current valued Hamiltonian to maximize
the social welfare function where utility depends on consumption. For simplicity only the re-
source stock constraint is introduced. Capital and consumption constraints are ignored. The
function to be maximized is:
W = ∫ (Ct) e-ρ t dt (a)
Where: W Social welfare
U: Utility
C: Consumption at time t
ρ: Social utility discount rate
Subject to the constraint:
=
dt
dS -Rt (b)
which means that the decrease in the stock at time t is equal to the extraction at time t.
The objective function of the current valued Hamiltonian is for this maximization problem is
Ht = U(Ct) + Pt(-Rt) (c)
The first order conditions for the current valued Hamiltonian are:
1)  Derivation with respect to the control variable C
0=
∂
∂
t
t
C
H
(d)
2)  Derivation with respect to the state variable S
dt
dPP
S
H
t
t
t
−=
∂
∂ ρ (e)
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Because ∂Ht/∂St = 0, (e) becomes ρPt = dP/dt, and after rearranging we get
ρ=
t
t
P
dtdP /
(f)
which is formula (2.1), the Hotelling's Rule, in the main text.
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Appendix C Depression tables
Table A Percentage depression values for yields on grassland with respect to the groundwater table

Groundwater table Yield depression Type of depression
(cm below soil surface) (in %)

10 21 Water overload
15 17 Water overload
25 10 Water overload
30 5 Water overload
35 2 Water overload
50 0 Optimal
55 0 Optimal
60 0 Optimal
70 1 Drought damage
75 1 Drought damage
105 3 Drought damage
110 4 Drought damage
140 8 Drought damage
150 10 Drought damage
170 15 Drought damage
200 21 Drought damage
260 25 Drought damage

Table B Percentage depression values for yields on arable land with respect to the groundwater table

Groundwater table Yield depression Type of depression
(cm below soil surface) (in %)

10 31 Water overload
15 27 Water overload
20 23 Water overload
25 15 Water overload
35 9 Water overload
50 6 Water overload
60 2 Water overload
100 0 Optimal
105 4 Drought damage
110 4 Drought damage
140 9 Drought damage
150 12 Drought damage
170 16 Drought damage
200 23 Drought damage
260 26 Drought damage
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
These tables are derived from the depression tables that are given in Werkgroep HELP
(1987). Table A is based on HELP-code H2b, number 61 in depression table G7. Table B is
based on HELP-code H2b, number 61 in depression table B7. HELP-code and number is in-
formation about the characteristics of the soil.
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Appendix D Constructed data set
(kVEM = kilo voeder eenheid melk (kilo feed unit milk))

Groundwater table Grass Maize Potatoes Sugar beets Grain
(cm below soil surface) (kVEM/ha) (kVEM/ha) (kg/ha) (kg/ha) (kg/ha)

10 7,315.4 8,162.7 31,740 42,021 3,167.1
15 7,685.8 8,635.9 33,580 44,457 3,350.7
20 8,009.9 9,109.1 35,420 46,893 3,534.3
25 8,334 10,055.5 39,100 51,765 3,901.5
30 8,797 10,410.4 40,480 53,592 4,039.2
35 9,074.8 10,765.3 41,860 55,419 4,176.9
40 9,136.5 10,883.6 42,320 56,028 4,222.8
45 9,198.3 11,001.9 42,780 56,637 4,268.7
50 9,260 11,120.2 43,240 57,246 4,314.6
55 9,260 11,356.8 44,160 58,464 4,406.4
60 9,260 11,593.4 45,080 59,682 4,498.2
65 9,213.7 11,622.98 45,195 59,834.3 4,509.68
70 9,167.4 11,652.55 45,310 59,986.5 4,521.15
75 9,167.4 11,682.13 45,425 60,138.8 4,532.63
80 9,136.5 11,711.7 45,540 60,291 4,544.1
85 9,105.7 11,741.28 45,655 60,443.3 4,555.58
90 9,074.8 11,770.85 45,770 60,595.5 4,567.05
95 9,043.9 11,800.43 45,885 60,747.8 4,578.53
100 9,013.1 11,830 46,000 60,900 4,590
105 8,982.2 11,356.8 43,654 59,133.9 4,511.97
110 8,889.6 11,356.8 43,654 59,133.9 4,511.97
115 8,827.9 11,258.22 43,213.17 58,702,5 4,471.81
120 8,766.1 11,159.63 42,772.3 58,271.2 4,431.65
125 8,704.4 11,061.05 42,331.5 57,839.8 4,391.48
130 8,642.7 10,962.47 4,1890.7 57,408.4 4,351.32
135 8,580.9 10,863.88 41,449.83 56,977 4,311.158
140 8,519.2 10,765.3 41,009 56,545.7 4,270.99
145 8,426.6 10,587.85 40,215.5 5,5769.2 4,198.7
150 8,334 10,410.4 39,422 54,992.7 4,126.41
155 8,218.25 10,292.1 38,893 54,475.1 4,078.22
160 8,102.5 10,173.8 38,364 53,957.4 4,028.01
165 7,986.75 10,055.5 37,835 53,439.8 3,976.3
170 7,871 9,937.2 37,306 52,922.1 3,933.63
175 7,778.4 9,799.18 36,688.83 52,318.2 3,877.4
180 7,685.8 9,661.17 36,071.7 51,714.3 3,821.18
185 7,593.2 9,523.15 35,454.5 51,110.3 3,764.95
190 7,500.6 9,385.13 34,837.3 50,506.4 3,708.72
195 7,408 9,247.12 34,220.17 49,902.5 3,652.49
200 7,315.4 9,109.1 33,603 49,298.6 3,596.27
205 7,284.6 9,079.53 33,470.75 49,169.1 3,584.22

100

Groundwater table Grass Maize Potatoes Sugar beets Grain
(cm below soil surface) (kVEM/ha) (kVEM/ha) (kg/ha) (kg/ha) (kg/ha)

210 7,253.7 9,049.95 33,338.5 49,039.7 3,572.17
215 7,222.8 9,020.38 33,206.25 48,910,3 3,560.12
220 7,191.9 8,990.8 33,074 48,780,9 3,548.07
225 7,161.1 8,961.23 32,941.75 48,651.5 3,536.02
230 7,130.2 8,931.65 32,809.5 48,522.1 3,523.97
235 7,099.3 8,902.08 32,677.25 48,392.7 3,511.92
240 7,068.5 8,872.5 32,545 48,263.3 3,499.88
245 7,037.6 8,842.93 32,412.75 48,133.8 3,487.83
250 7,006.7 8,813.35 32,280.5 48,004.4 3,475.78
255 6,975.9 8,783.78 32,148.25 47,875 3,463.73
260 6,945 8,754.2 32,016 47,745.6 3,451.68

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Appendix E Curve estimations for maize, potatoes, sugar
beets and grain
a) Maize
b) Potatoes
102
c) Sugar Beets
d) Grain
103
Appendix F Production values of crops
104
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Appendix G Gams specification
Model for finding the optimal groundwater level while maximizing total agricultural revenue
Scalar
PG price of grass per kVEM /0.31/
PM price of maize per kVEM /0.31/
PP price of potatoes per kg /0.115/
PS price of sugar beets per kg /0.099/
PGN price of grain per kg /0.46/
HAG hectares of grass /60/
HAMhectares of maize /25/
HAP hectares of potatoes /5/
HAS hectares of sugar beet /5/
HAGN hectares of grain /5/;
Variables
YG yield of grass per hectare
YM yield of maize per hectare
YP yield of potatoes per hectare
YS yield of sugar beets per hectare
YGN yield of grain per hectare
REVG revenue grass
REVM revenue maize
REVP revenue potatoes
REVS revenue sugar beets
REVGN revenue grain
TOTREV total revenue
VNI value of index of nature;
Positive variables
GW groundwater table
TAA total agricultural area;
GW.LO=30;
GW.UP=250
TAA.UP=100;
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Equations
YYG yield of grass
YYM yield of maize
YYP yield of potatoes
YYS yield of sugar beets
YYGN yield of grain
TTAA total agricultural area
RREVG revenue grass per hectare
RREVM revenue maize per hectare
RREVP revenue potatoes per hectare
RREVS revenue sugar beets per hectare
RREVGN revenue grain per hectare
TTOTREV total revenue
VVNI value of nature index;
VVNI.. VNI =E= 100*(2.72**(0.2-(GW/100)));
YYG.. YG =E= 7172.987+(59.795*GW)-(0.51*(GW**2))+(0.001*(GW**3));
YYM.. YM =E= 7487.919+(112.811*GW)-(0.9*(GW**2))+(0.002*(GW**3));
YYP.. YP =E= 28822.508+(456.818*GW)-(3.733*(GW**2))+(0.008*(GW**3));
YYS.. YS =E= 38936.056+(556.699*GW)-(4.319*(GW**2))+(0.009*(GW**3));
YYGN.. YGN=E= 2884.929+(44.129*GW)-(0.344*(GW**2))+(0.0007*(GW**3));
TTAA.. TAA=E= HAM+HAG+HAP+HAS+HAGN;
RREVG.. REVG =E= YG*PG*HAG;
RREVM.. REVM =E= YM*PM*HAM;
RREVP.. REVP =E= YP*PP*HAP;
RREVS.. REVS =E= YS*PS*HAS;
RREVGN..REVGN=E= YGN*PGN*HAGN;
TTOTREV TOTREV =E= REVG+REVM+REVP+REVS+REVGN;
model model /all/
solve model using dnlp maximizing TOTREV;
Modifications for the calculation of optimal combined groundwater table and for the sensi-
tivity analysis:
Monetary valuation of nature:
1) VVNI.. VNI =E= 500*(2.72**(0.2-(GW/100)));
2) VVNI.. VNI =E= 750*(2.72**(0.2-(GW/100)));
3) VVNI.. VNI =E= 1,000*(2.72**(0.2-(GW/100)));
4) VVNI.. VNI =E= 500*((2.72**(0.2-(GW/100)))**2);
5) VVNI.. VNI =E= 750*((2.72**(0.2-(GW/100)))**2);
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Maximizing combined revenue:
COMBREV combined revenue (agriculture + nature);
CCOMBREV COMBREV =E= (TOTREV/100)+VNI;
:
:
solve model using dnlp maximizing COMBREV.
